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Introduction: Tafsīr as theology
The Qur’ān has always been understood in variant ways by the different 
schools and sects within the Islamic tradition. These different interpreta-
tions arose due to methodological and textual differences in consonantal, 
grammatical, and semantical readings. Within the Sunnī tradition the mul-
tiple readings (qirā’āt) and interpretations (tafsīr and ta’wīl) generated and ac-
knowledged by it, are classified based on historical, theological, and logical 
criteria.1 The employment of both grammar and semantics in the service of 
establishing narrative, ethico-legal and theological possibilities and premises 
was one of purposes of the tafsīr tradition. Qur’ānic exegesis played, next to 
theological tracts themselves, a central role in propagating the theologies of 
different schools of thought. The Khawārij, Mu‘tazila, Sunnī orthodoxy, the 
different sects among the Shī‘a, and other schools and sects, all had generated 
exegetical works to promote and establish the premisses and main founda-
tions of their theologies. 2 With the start of the classical period there not only 
1 On the classification of readings, see: Muḥammad Shaykh Ibrāhīm Ḥaqqī,  ‘Ulūm al-qur’ān 
min khilāl muqadimāt al-tafāsīr  (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Risālah, 2004), 2: 251-257; Mannā‘ 
al-Qaṭṭān, Mabāḥith fī ‘ulūm al-Qur’ān (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Risālah, 2009), 157-168; Re-
cep Doğan, Usūl al-tafsīr: The sciences and methodology of the Qur’ān (Clifton: Tughra Books, 
2014), 246-9. 
2 Muṣṭafā Muḥaqqiq Dāmād, “The Quran and Schools of Islamic Theology and Philosophy” 
in The Study Quran: A new translation with notes and commentary (referred to as SQ from 
here on), Seyyed Hossein Nasr e.a. Ed. (United States: HarperOne, 2015), 1719-1735; Hussein 
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emerged multiple tafsīr works which provide commentary on almost all vers-
es in the Qur’ān, but also encyclopedic works (muṭawwalāt al-tafsīr, “lengthy 
exegesis”) which gathered as many and as diverse exegetical commentary 
as possible. Although the gathered material was clearly selected by apply-
ing preference, it also included the opinions or traditions from what were 
deemed rival or heretical schools. These were included partially to refute 
them, many times also as a citation of an acceptable opinion, or to reframe 
them in service of another theological construct. We see this with early clas-
sical works as that of Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923) whose work epitomizes 
the traditional exegesis (tafsīr bi-l-mā’thūr/riwāya) genre3, and by Abū Manṣūr 
al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) whose work epitomizes the rational exegesis (tafsīr 
bi-l-rā’y/dirāya) genre4, which are important sources for pre-classical exegesis. 
In the post-classical period we also see the emergence of smaller works which 
generally summarize the most accepted exegetical positions of the formative 
and classical period (al-mukhtaṣarāt, “summaries”), showing a crystalliza-
tion of the tafsīr genre.5 The most famous works of this type is by Ibn ‘Umar 
al-Zamaksharī (d. 538/1144) and ‘Abd Allāh al-Bayḍāwī (d. 685/1286), whom 
also became the most popular subject of another post-classical trend: the su-
percommentary tradition (shurūḥ, “explotorary commentaries”, and ḥawāshī, 
“marginal or gloss commentaries”).6 These supercommentaries added to 
Abdul-Raof, Schools of Qur’anic Exegesis: Genesis and development (Abdingdon: Routledge, 
2010), 55-83, 111-164; Hussein Abdul-Raof, Theological approaches to Qur’anic exegesis: A 
practical comparative-contrastive analysis (London: Taylor & Francis, 2010), 84-93; Yāsir b. 
Māṭer al-Maṭrafī,  Al-‘aqā’idiyyat wa tafsīr, al-naṣṣ, al-qur’āniyya  (Beirut: Markaz Namā’ li-
l-buḥūth wa al-darāsāt, 2016), 67-74, 605-691; Suleiman A. Mourad, “The Survival Of The 
Mu‘tazila Tradition Of Qur’anic Exegesis In Shī‘ī And Sunnī Tafāsīr”, Journal Of Qur’anic Stud-
ies, 2010.
3 Although some identify al-Ṭabarī’s approach as being between the genres, labelling it as 
tafsīr al-athār al-naẓarī (exegesis through tradition and insight). On al-Ṭabarī and his exege-
sis, see: Ḥaqqī, ‘ulūm al-qur’ān, 1: 265-296; Al-Maṭrafī, Al-‘aqā’idiyyat wa tafsīr, 610-615.
4 On al-Māturīdī and his exegesis, see: Ahmad Choirul Rofiq, “The Methodology Of Al-Maturi-
di’s Qur’anic Exegesis: Study Of Ta’wilat Ahl Al-Sunnah”, Al-Jami’ah: Journal of Islamic Studies 
47/2 (2009); Walid A. Saleh, “Rereading Al-Ṭabarī Through Al-Māturīdī: New Light On The 
Third Century Hijrī”, Journal of Qur’anic Studies 18/2 (2016): 180-209; Al-Maṭrafī, Al-‘aqā’idi-
yyat wa tafsīr, 688-691.
5 Walid A. Saleh, The Formation Of The Classical Tafsīr Tradition: The Qur’ān Commentary Of 
Al-Tha‘labī (D. 427/1035) (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 14-23; Walid Saleh, “Quranic Commentaries” in 
SQ, 1645-1658.
6 For a full discussion on the supercommentary tradition, see: Eric van Lit, “Commentary 
And Commentary Tradition: The Basic Terms For Understanding Islamic Intellectual Histo-
ry”, MIDÉO 32 (2016): 3-26; Asad Q. Ahmed and Margaret Larkin, “The Ḥāshiya And Islamic 
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popular exegetical texts full explanations (as was done with al- Bayḍāwī’s exe-
gesis) or refutations (as was done with al-Zamakhsharī’s exegesis), others used 
these texts as headers for their own legal or theological discourse. It is in this 
mature phase of the tafsīr tradition where the Ottomans define themselves 
not only by their emphasis on deep linguistic and rhetorical exegesis, but also 
the full incorporation, into their exegetical activity, of the Islamic and philo-
sophical sciences as taught in the Ottoman curriculum.7 In the post-classical 
period and after, Sunnī exegesis is dominated by exegetes from the Ash‘arī 
and Māturīdī8 schools whereby they generally focus on the Mu‘tazila as the 
theological Other.9 The tafsīr tradition, as an accumulative and overarching 
science, was a source through which different schools and sects could reflect, 
respond and learn from another. But the tafsīr tradition also became a repos-
itory for theological positions which are generally not discussed in official 
theological tracts. Understanding the Ottoman tafsīr tradition would there-
fore imply one also understands the Ottoman theological tradition, which is 
a theme we will explore. One of the theses proposed in this paper is that Otto-
man tafsīr tradition developed parallel to the rise of Ottoman ikhtilāf literature 
on Ash‘arī-Māturīdī differences (such as the famous tract by Ibn Kamāl Pāshā 
Intellectual History”, Oriens 41/3-4 (2013): 213-216; Walid A. Saleh, “The Gloss As Intellectual 
History: The Ḥāshiyahs On Al-Kashshāf”, Oriens 41/3-4 (2013): 218-220. On the time periods, 
see: Haim Gerber, Islamic Law And Culture, 1600-1840 (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 3 fn.8; Abdul-Raof, 
Schools of Qur’anic Exegesis, 11-12; Shuruq Naguib, “Guiding The Sound Mind: Ebu’S-Su‘ūd’s 
Tafsir and Rhetorical Interpretation of the Qur’an in the Post-Classical Period”,  Osmanlı 
Araştırmaları / The Journal Of Ottoman Studies (2013): 2 fn.3.
7 Naguib, ibid, 13-15; Hamza Karamali, The Madrasa Curriculum in Context (UAE: Kalam Re-
search & Media, 2017), 17-18. For an overview of Ottoman exegetes, see: Mustafa Ozturk, 
“Osmanlı Tefsir Kültütüne: Panoramik Bir Bakış” in Osmanlı Toplumunda Kur’an Kültürü ve 
Tefsir Çalışmalar, volume 1 (Istanbul: ilim Yayma Vakfı Kur’an ve Tefsir Akademisi, 2011).
8 Rational exegesis is the dominant typology within the tafsīr tradition from the late forma-
tive period right up to today, to state otherwise as several have done (such as Goldziher and 
Abdul-Raof) is to simply ignore the fact that the majority of the extant exegetical works are 
from this typology. This probably comes from the outdated (or ideologically framed) pre-
sumption that extreme traditionalism was an authentic outgrowth of Islam, and rational-
ism a hellenistic import. For a discussion on this, see: Saleh, “Rereading Al-Ṭabarī Through 
Al-Māturīdī”, 181, 193-195; Walid Saleh, “Book Review ‘Schools Of Qur’ānic Exegesis: Genesis 
And Development’”, Journal Of Islamic Studies 23/1 (2012): 85-87; Al-Maṭrafī, Al-‘aqā’idiyyat 
wa tafsīr, 678-691.
9 Abdul-Raof, Theological approaches to Qur’anic exegesis, 46-47, 51-53; Albayrak İsmail, “‘The 
Other’ Among Us: The Perception Of Khārijī And Ibāḍī Islam In The Muslim Exegetical Tradi-
tions”, Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi 54/1 (2013): 35-63; Al-Maṭrafī, Al-‘aqā’idi-
yyat wa tafsīr, 193-220.
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(Kemālpāshazāde, d. 940/1533)) and functioned as a reconciliatory science or 
synthesis between dominant Mu‘tazila and Ash‘arī exegesis.10 The main dif-
ferences between the Māturīdī and Ash‘arī were according to some as low as 
five or as high as fifty, depending on what one counts as a school-defining 
heuristic. But two of the central defining differences revolved around rational 
knowledge and how this relates to the nature of God. Within the tafsīr tradi-
tion these theological discussions became connected to certain verses. Some 
were obvious, such as the discussion on verse Q.17:15 surrounding rational re-
sponsibility. But other connections were not as obvious. Sometimes because 
the subject already occured in an earlier verse, or simply because you would 
not expect a certain phrasing or grammatical construct to invite such com-
plex discourses. Of the latter is Q.2:29 a great example of not only complex 
discourse connected to small element of a verse {He created for you (khalaqa 
la-kum)}, but also the school-defining heuristic it became to represent. Within 
the tafsīr tradition it became the defining verse to discuss ontological ethics, 
and therefore also invited extensive Ḥanafī-Māturīdī apologetics: did God 
create everything with an inherit benefit (intifā‘) and permittence (mubāḥat 
fī al-aṣl), and does this ontology generate ethical responsibility (taklīf)? The 
adherents of this position are called the people of permittence (ahl al-ibāḥa), 
and are mainly from the Ḥanafī school (the Mu‘tazila and Māturīdī), who ar-
gued that as God is without need it means creation is created for the benefit 
of creation itself, and must be rationally constructed and inherently good for 
humans.11 According to the Late Ottoman exegete ‘Iṣām al-Dīn al-Qūnawī (d. 
1195/1781) the lām in la-kum {for you} implies a rationale (ta‘līl) and purpose 
(ghāyya/gharaḍ) behind the act of creation.12 The opponents of this position, 
mainly from the Ash‘arī, saw this as obligating and restraining God as He must 
10 On the rise of Ottoman ikhtilāf literature, see: Yayha Raad Haidar, The Debates Between 
Ash’arism and Māturīdism in Ottoman Religious Scholarship: A Historical and Bibliographical 
Study (PhD thesis, 2016), 116-117, 170-173, 204-208.
11 Anver Emon, Islamic Natural Law Theories (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2010), 
40-41; ‘Abd Allāh al-Nasafī,  Tafsīr al-Nasafī aw madārik al-tanzīl wa ḥaqā’īq al-tā’wīl (Bei-
rut: Dār al-Ma‘rifa, 2008), 43; Aḥmad b. Abū Sa‘īd Mullājiyūn al-Ḥanafī,  Tafsīrāt al-aḥ-
madiyya fī bayān al-ayāt al-shara‘iyyat (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyyah, 2010), 21-23; Al-
Qūnawī, Ḥāshiyat Al-Qūnawī, 3: 81-87; Wahba al-Zuḥaylī, Uṣūl al-fiqh al-islāmī (Damascus: 
Dār al-Fikr, 2013), 1: 93-98; Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq b. Shāh al-Hindī, Al-iklīl ‘alā madārik al-
tanzīl wa ḥaqā’īq al-tā’wīl (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyyah, 2012), 1: 304-306; Haytham ‘Abd 
al-Ḥamīd Khazna, Taṭawwur al-fikr al-uṣūlī Ḥanafī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyyah, 2012), 
323-327, 347-359.
12 Al-Qūnawī, Ḥāshiyat Al-Qūnawī, 3: 82. See also: Shāh al-Hindī, Al-iklīl ‘alā madārik, 1: 302.
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adhere to creational needs and purposes.13 Al-Rāzī therefore states that the 
lām does not imply for humans but must be understood in line with Q.51:56 {I 
have created the Jinn and mankind except to worship Me (li-ya‘budūni)}.14 
The Mu‘tazila argued from the idea that God was obligated to do the best 
for creation (al-aṣlaḥ), the Māturīdī on the other hand argued from the idea 
that the beneficial purpose of the act of creation comes from divine wisdom 
(al-ḥikma) and therefore does not imply an external obligation on God. The 
Ash‘arī rejected the former, but partially accepted the latter.15 The exegesis 
surrounding this verse shows how the Māturīdī not simply developed a mid-
dle path between the Ash‘arī and Mu‘tazila, but self-identified their theolog-
ical tradition as being directly linked to the founders of the Ḥanafī school 
itself, and therefore being older than either the Mu‘tazila or the Ash‘arī. We 
see a similar claim surrounding Q.17:15 {we do not punish until we sent a 
messenger}, where the Māturīdī defend the concept of rational responsi-
bility as a teaching of Abū Ḥanifā (d. 150/767) himself. The founder of the 
Ḥanafīte theological school, Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, explains that the mes-
senger in Q.17:15 is preceded by human reason:
”And in the verse is proof that monotheism is required for them by reason 
(bi-l-‘aql). [...] If it was not required, then when messengers are sent to call 
them towards [monotheism], they would say, ‘Who are you, who sent you 
to us?’[...] but God from His grace wanted to remove doubts from them, and 
eliminate any excuse, by sending them a messenger. For there are three 
causes of knowledge (asbāb al-‘ilm)16: (1.) what they learn through the appa-
13 Al-Rāzī, Al-Tafsīr al-kabīr, 2: 141-142; Abū ‘abd Allāh b. Aḥmad al-Qurṭubī, Al-jāmi‘ li-aḥkām 
al-qur’ān (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, 1964), 251-252. The majority of the Ash‘arī rejected 
the ibāḥa position from a theological perspective, but embraced it in their philosophy of 
law (uṣūl al-fiqh) whereby the maxim “The principle is that all things are permitted (al-aṣl fī 
al-ashā’ al-ibāḥa)” became accepted by most schools. Shāh al-Hindī, Al-iklīl ‘alā madārik, 1: 
303; Muḥammad Muṣṭafā al-Zuḥaylī, Al-qawā‘id al-fiqhiyya wa taṭbīqātahā fī al-madhāhib 
al-arba‘ (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 2006), 1: 111/190-194; Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, Islamic Le-
gal Maxims (Qawā’id Fiqhiyyah) (Islamabad: Center for Excellence in Research, 2016), 110-115. 
For a critique on this seemingly contradicting stance, see: Ṭahir Ibn ‘Āshūr, Tafsīr al-taḥrīr wa 
al-tanwīr (Tunis: Dār Sahnun li-l-Nushr wa-l-Tawzī ‘, n.dt.), 1: 379-381.
14 Al-Rāzī, Al-Tafsīr al-kabīr, 2: 142.
15 Ulrich Rudolph, Al-Māturīdī and the Development of Sunnī Theology in Samarqand (Leiden: 
Brill, 2015), 296-300; Ramon Harvey, The Qur’an and the Just Society (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2017), 28-33; Ibn Kamāl Bāshā, Masā’il al-ikhtilāf bayna al-asha‘ira wa al-
māturīdīyya (Beirut: Dār al-Dakhā’ir, 2015), 29-33; Khazna, Taṭawwur al-fikr al-uṣūlī Ḥanafī, 
323-327.
16 These three causes of knowledge are central in Islamic scholastic theology, such as rephrased 
in the famous Māturīdī tract ‘Aqā’id al-Nasafī: (1.) sound senses (al-ḥawās al-salīm), (2.) re-
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rent senses together with intuition, (2.) and some also add understanding 
through contemplation and reflection (bi-l-tā’mmul wa-l-naẓar), (3.) while 
others do not learn except through teachings and warnings.”17
As the Mu‘tazila had an almost similar approach to this verse18, it became a 
central polemic concern for Ash‘arī exegetes such as al-Bayḍāwī who empha-
sized that the literal import of the verse mitigates any claim for rational re-
sponsibility or obligation apart from revelation. Al-Qūnawī, in his extensive 
ḥāshiya on Bayḍāwī’s exegesis, confronts this refutation head on:
“And [al-Bayḍāwī] says ‘and in it is the proof that there is no obligation be-
fore the revelation of the divine law’, meaning there is no obligation on the 
responsible person (al-mukallaf) before the divine law is cognitively related 
to him, because if reason obligates it is required that when he leaves the 
obligation unfulfilled he is liable for divine punishment. But the Exalted 
clearly states that {and We do not punish until we sent a messenger} whi-
ch nullifies any required punishment. [And al-Bayḍāwī’s] intent is to refute 
(radd) the scholars of the Māturīdī19 and to slander (tashnī‘) the Mu‘tazila 
as they state that reason rules by obligation over all matters, and from this 
statement they establish that good and evil are known by reason. But our 
scholars [of the Māturīdī] follow the opinion that good and evil are known 
by reason as established by the Most Wise, which is God the Exalted. And 
liable reports (al-khabar al-ṣādiq), (3.) intellect/reasoning (‘aql). See: Aḥmad Farīd al-Mazīdī 
(Ed.), Shurūḥ wa ḥawāshī al- ‘aqā’id al-nasafiyya li-ahl al-sunna wa-l-jamā ‘a al-ash ‘ira wa-l-
māturīdiyya (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyyah, 2013), 1: 87-95, 2: 219-605.
17 Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, Tā’wīlāt ahl al-sunnah (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 2012), 7: 
19.
18 See: Ibn ‘Umar al-Zamaksharī, al-Kashshāf ‘an ḥaqā’iq al-tanzīl wa ‘uyūn al-aqāwīl fī wu-
juh al-tā’wīl wa ma‘a ḥawāshī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyyah, 2015), 2: 268. Quṭb al-Dīn 
Maḥmūd (d. 710/1311) accusses al-Zamakhsharī of strategems (al-ḥiyal) because of stating 
that no people are destroyed before the sending of the messenger but incorporating this 
with the Mu‘tazila argument that people already have knowledge of God and “what is requ-
ired” through reason. Maḥmūd points out that the Mu‘tazila believe that the majority of 
rulings (aḥkām) are known through reason, so technically revelation would not add much 
to people’s obligations, and al-Zamakhsharī does not state this Mu‘tazila belief clearly. 
‘Umar b. Muḥammad al-Sakūnī (d. 717/1317) identifies al-Zamakhsharī’s take on Q.17:15 as 
completely falling in line with Mu‘tazila opinion (wa hadhā kullihu ī‘tizāl). Maḥmūd’s super-
commentary in al-Kashshāf, fn.1; ‘Umar b. Muḥammad al-Sakūnī, al-Tamyīz limā awda‘hu 
al-Zamakhsharī min al-i‘tizāl fī tafsīr al-kitāb al-‘azīz (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyyah, 
2005), 2: 386-387.
19 This self-identification as Māturīdī and references and citations to their founding namesake 
is prominent within Ottoman exegesis. 
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that similar matters such as belief in the Prophet, peace be upon him, are 
divinely imposed by the divine law, and when something is not imposed by 
the divine law it is obligated by reason when it falls under rationally known 
ethics. Therefore the messenger [in this verse] is universal, meaning rea-
son. And this is the opinion of Imām Abū Ḥanifā in that anyone to whom 
revelation has not reached, and he does not believe in the existence of God 
and His oneness, then that person will be in the hellfire forever as this is a 
fact known by reason.”20
Another verse which became connected to the discussion surrounding ratio-
nal responsibility is Q.11:117 {And your Lord does not destroy the communi-
ties through/because of wrongdoing while its people are rightdoers}, which 
is concerned with the cause for divine worldly punishment. Does Q.11:117 sim-
ply deny that God is unjust in His punishment, or does it also deny that God 
punished civilizations simply because they were infidels? What triggers divine 
worldly punishment? How did the Ottoman tafsīr tradition engage the differ-
ent exegetical approaches to verses such as Q.11:117, and what function had 
Māturīdī theology within its development? To understand these discussions 
surrounding Q.2:29, 17:15, and 11:117 we need first to further understand how 
rational obligation (taklīf ‘aqli) and the relation between faith and ethics devel-
oped within Islamic theology. 
Islamic theology and rational obligation
The earliest main theological positions held by the Muslim community were 
generally simple ethical-monotheistic mirror images of their polytheistic 
counterparts whereby the early Muslims could adhere to the apparent mean-
ing of key Qur’ān verses: God is one; He is independent and in total control 
of creation; He has no partners or intermediaries; and He will hold humans 
accountable for their ethical and creedal violations.21 When it came to more 
detailed positions it became more difficult to uphold or to determine the ap-
parent meaning, such as: 1) how the seemingly anthropomorphic divine at-
tributes of hands and face were to be understood22; 2) do humans have free 
20 Al-Qūnawī, Ḥāshiyat Al-Qūnawī, 11: 463.
21 Cf. Q.112:1-4, 6:133, 10:68, 22:64-65, 35:15, 40:48-52 etc. On early Muslim theology, see: Harry 
Austryn Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalam (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1976), 5-6.
22 The most disputed anthropomorphic attributes in the Qur’ān are: God’s hands (yad), 
Q.5:64, 7:57, 36:71, 38:75, 39:67, 48:10, 67:1; God’s shin (sāq), Q68:42; and God’s face (wajh), 
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will23; 3) whether believers can become unbelievers through performing sins, 
if they go to hell for them, and if so, in what way (i.e. the status and fate of the 
grave sinner (fāsiq)24); 4) or if people who died before the prophetic message 
reached them were responsible for their wrongdoing. Most of these positions 
were seemingly not resolved in a definitive way by the prophetic teachings, 
which caused two approaches among the early generations, suspend judge-
ment on these subjects by delegating all interpretive authority back to God 
(tafwīḍ), or applying reasoned opinion (rā’y or ijtihād) to determine acceptable 
and coherent interpretations.25 
The questions surrounding belief and works revolved around three main is-
sues: 
  i. can humans rationally know God and ethics,
 ii. how are belief and ethics connected, 
iii. and when does responsibility (taklīf) sets in? 
The majority among the Sunnī theologians state that people who died before 
any prophet or revelation reached them fully (bulūgh al-da‘wa) to have died on 
Q2:115/272, 28:88, 30:38-39, 55:27, and 76:9. For the different ways these were understood, 
see: Abdur-Rahman Ibn Yusuf, Imam Abū Ḥanīfa’s Al-Fiqh Al-Akbar Explained (London: White 
Thread Press, 2007), 99-104; Mullā ‘Alī al-Qārī, Sharḥ kitāb al-fiqh al-akbar (Beirut: Dār al-Ku-
tub al-‘ilmiyyah, 2007), 62-72; Ibn Abī al-’Izz, Commentary On The Creed Of At-Ṭaḥāwī (Sharh 
Al-’Aqidah At-Ṭaḥāwīyyah) (Riyad: al-Imam Muhammad Ibn Sa’ud Islamic University, 2000), 
147-162; Wolfson, ibid, 8-17; Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ Farfūr and Wesam Charkawi,  The Beneficial 
Message and the Definitive Proof in the Study of Theology (London: Azhar Academy, 2010), 
131-138.
23 i.e. the question on divine decree (qadar) and decision (qaḍā’), and human will (irāda) and 
acquisition (kasb). For the different ways these were understood, see: Al-Qārī, Sharḥ, 29, 75-
98; Ibn Abī al-’Izz, ibid, 392-413; ‘Alī Juma ‘a, Ḥāshiya Al-Imām Al-Bajūriyya ‘alā Jawharat Al-
Ṭawḥīd (Cairo: Dār al-Salām li-l-Ṭabā‘ wa-l-Nashar wa-l-Tawzī‘ wa-l-Tarjama, 2012), 175-177; 
Rudolph, ibid, 112, 302-308; Wolfson, ibid, 601-719; J. Meric Pessagno, “Irāda, Ikhtiyār, Qudra, 
Kasb The View of Abū Manṣur al-Māturīdī”,  Journal Of The American Oriental Society 104/1 
(1984): 177-191.
24 For a full discussion on fāsiq among the different schools of thought, see: Toshihiko Izut-
su, The Concept Of Belief In Islamic Theology: A Semantic Analysis of Īmān and Islām (Kuala 
Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 2006), 43-70.
25 Al-Maṭrafī, Al-‘aqā’idiyyat wa tafsīr, 97-146, 396-398, 448; Al-‘ak, Uṣul al-tafsīr, 54-55; Aḥ-
mad ibn Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn Jahbal, The Refutation of Him [Ibn Taymiyya] Who Attributes Di-
rection to Allāh (Al-Raddu ʻalā Man Qāla Bil-Jiha), Gibril Fouad Haddad trans. (Birmingham, 
UK: AQSA Publications, 2008), 114-118; Ḥamad Al-Sinān and Fawzī Al-‘anjarī, Ahl Al-Sunnat 
Al-Ash‘ārah: Shihādat ‘ulamā’ Wa Adillatuhum (Kuwait: Dār al-Ḍiyā’ li-l-Nushr wa al-Tawzī‘, 
2006), 102, 148-170; Al-Mazīdī, Shurūḥ wa ḥawāshī, 1: 83-85.
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their primordial nature (fiṭra)26 and are deemed ‘the people of the interval [be-
tween prophets] (ahl al-fatra)’ who are not (fully) responsible for their faith and 
deeds.27 The question of course is what is beyond someone’s responsibility, and 
what defines the sending of a messenger? The Māturīdī, who similarly to the 
Mu‘tazila28, follow Abū Ḥanīfa in the opinion that people can know through 
reason that God exists. Those people are therefore obligated to inquire about 
the origins of existence within their mental capabilities (“obligation to inquire 
(wujūb al-naẓar)” or “necessary knowledge (‘ilm al-ḍarūra)”).29 And through the 
same signs in the world by which humans can interfere God’s existence they 
can also discern the main differences between good and evil (al-taḥsīn wa al-
taqbīḥ). The Māturīdī therefore adhere to ethical objectivism30, and hold people 
26 On fiṭra, see: Frank Griffel, “Al-Ghazālī’s Use of “Original Human Disposition” (fiṭra) and Its 
Background in the Teachings of Al-Fārābī and Avicenna”, The Muslim World 102 (2012).
27 “The principle position of the Ash‘arī is that whoever dies, and the message ]of Islam] has 
not reached him (tablughuhu al-da‘wa), dies saved. However, the Māturīdī say, whoever dies 
before he has time to contemplate (al-tā’mmul), and does not have faith or disbelief, then no 
punishment is on him.” Muḥammad Amīn Ibn ‘Ābidīn, Radd al-muḥtār ‘alā durr al-mukhtār 
(Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1992), 3: 185. On bulūgh al-da‘wa, ahl al-fatra, intercession (shafā‘), and 
salvation outside Islam, see: SQ, 31-32; Al-Alūsī, Rūḥ al-ma‘ānī, 15: 47-57; Al-Qūnawī, Ḥāshi-
yat Al-Qūnawī, 11: 463; Farfūr, ibid, 66-73; Abū al-Thanā Maḥmūd al-Lāmishī,  Kitāb fī uṣūl 
al-fiqh  (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1995), 103-104; Wahba al-Zuḥaylī, Al-tafsīr al-munīr 
fī al-‘aqīda wa al-sharī‘a wa al-minhaj (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 2003), 6: 64-65; Abū al-Mu‘īn 
al-Nasafī, Baḥr al-kalām yabḥthu fī ba‘ḍ al-firaq al-islāmiyya wa-l-radd ‘alayhā min al-kitāb 
wa-l-sunna  (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyyah, 2005), 100-101; Al-Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār b. 
Aḥmad, Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa  (Cairo: Al-Hay’at al-Miṣriyyat al-‘āmmat li-l-kitāb, 2009), 
477-479; Mohammad Fadel, “No Salvation outside Islam” Muslim Modernists, Democratic 
Politics, and Islamic Theological Exclusivism”, and: Tim Winter, “Realism and the Real: Theol-
ogy and the problem of Alternative Expressions of God”, in Between Heaven And Hell Islam, 
Salvation, And The Fate Of Others (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Muḥammad 
b. Rasūl al-Barzanjī, Sadād al-dīn wa sadād al-dayn fī ithbāt al-najāt wa al-darajāt li-l-wali-
dayn (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyyah, 2006), 174-194. 
28 On the Mu‘tazila concepts of reason (‘aql), intellectual insight (naẓar) and necessary knowl-
edge (‘ilm al-ḍarūra), see: Al-Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār,  Al-mughnī fī abwāb al-tawḥīd wa-l-‘adl 
(Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyyah, 2012), 12: 28-147; ‘Abd al-Jabbār,  Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-kham-
sa, 50-52, 64-76; Mariam al-Attar,  Islamic Ethics: Divine Command Theory In Arabo-Islamic 
Thought (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 69-80.
29 Rudolph, ibid, 232, 262-268, 274; Abū al-Mu‘īn al-Nasafī, Baḥr al-kalām, 16-17. On “necessary 
knowledge”, see: Binyamin Abrahamov, “Necessary Knowledge In Islamic Theology”, British 
Journal Of Middle Eastern Studies 20/1 (1993): 20-32.
30 Ethical objectivism is also known as natural law theory or moral realism, on this see: Mark 
C Murphy,  God And Moral Law: On The Theistic Explanation Of Morality  (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 69-99; Alessandro Passerin d’Entrèves, Natural Law: An Introduction 
To Legal Philosophy (UK: Hutchinson & Co, 1972), 37-50; Emon, Islamic Natural Law Theories, 
7-11; Al-Attar, ibid, 12.
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responsible for their general beliefs and works apart from revelation (i.e. taklīf 
‘aqlī).31 It is because of this that the Māturīdī shared overlapping discourses and 
concerns with the Mu‘tazila, and was seen as a middle path between the latter 
and the Ash‘arī. But there is an important difference between the Mu‘tazila 
and the Māturīdī in how reason obligates. For the Mu‘tazila reason obligates 
by essence (bi-l-dhāt) and therefore obligates directly when (even minimally) 
present, while for the Māturīdī it only obligates after both sanity and maturity 
are fully attained so a person has the ability to know his obligations (kamāl 
al-‘aql ma‘rafa  li-l-wujūb)  and even then people can be excused (‘udhr) for mat-
ters which are unclear.32 The general position among the early Ash‘arī is that 
reason can only provide possible knowledge about God and ethics, therefore 
worldly and eschatological obligation is only acquired through revelation.33 
The main Ash‘arī position can therefore be defined as an adherence to ethi-
cal voluntarism.34 The later (post-1100) Ash‘arī have a more nuanced position 
31 The Ḥanafī for the majority upheld rational responsibility, which is generally summed up 
by referring to founding scholars as Abū Ḥanifā, al-Karkhī, al-Māturīdī, the majority of Iraqi 
Ḥanafī’s, and the Mu‘tazila, versus the suspenders of obligation (similar to the later Ash‘arī) 
by the Samarqand/Bukhara Ḥanafī’s. Anver Emon labels this type of moral realism as hard 
natural law. Cf. A. Kevin Reinhart, Before Revelation: The Boundaries Of Muslim Moral Thought 
(Albany, NY: State Univ. of New York Press, 1995), 43-56, 79-86; Al-Qūnawī,  Ḥāshiyat Al-
Qūnawī, 11: 463; Emon, Islamic Natural Law Theories, 45-89; Al-Lāmishī, Kitāb, 66, 103-104; 
Al-Zuḥaylī, Uṣūl, 1: 123-124, 127-134; ‘Alī Juma ‘a, Ḥāshiya, 71; Harvey, ibid, 34-39; Abū Bakr al-
Rāzī al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Uṣūl al-Jaṣṣāṣ al-masammā al-fuṣūl fī-l-uṣūl (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyyah, 
2010), 2: 99-105; Abū Zayd al-Dabūsī,  Taqwīm al-adilat fī uṣūl al-fiqh (Beirut: Al-Maktaba 
al-‘Aṣriya, 2006), 464-477; Aḥmad Ḥilmī Ḥarb, Al-ṣillat bayna uṣul al-fiqh wa ‘ilm al-kalām fī 
masālatayya al-taḥsīn wa-l-taqbīḥ af‘āla Allāh ta‘ālā (Dār al-nūr al-mubīn wa-l-nushr wa-l-
tawzī‘, 2015), 133-164; Ahmed Akgündüz, Introduction To Islamic Law (Rotterdam: IUR Press, 
2010), 216-220; Aḥmad b. Abū Sa‘īd Mullājiyūn al-Ḥanafī,  Nūr al-anwār Sharḥ Risālat Al-
Manār (Karachi: Maktabat al-Bushrā, 2017), 1: 146-147/197; Ibn Kamāl Bāshā, Masā’il, 41-54, 
57-60; Al-Maṭrafī, Al-‘aqā’idiyyat wa tafsīr, 446-447; Ibn ‘Ābidīn, Radd al-muḥtār, 4: 258-259; 
Khazna, Taṭawwur al-fikr al-uṣūlī Ḥanafī, 343-359.
32 Sa‘ad al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī,  Sharḥ al-talwīḥ ‘alā al-tawḍīḥ li-matn al-tanqīḥ  (Beirut: Dār al-
Kutub al-‘ilmiyyah, 2013), 2: 334-337; Khazna, Taṭawwur al-fikr al-uṣūlī Ḥanafī, 326.
33 Sa‘ad al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī,  Sharḥ al-maqāṣid  (Beirut: ‘Ālam al-Kutub, 1998), 4: 282-306; Al-
Maṭrafī, Al-‘aqā’idiyyat wa tafsīr, 432-435; ‘Alī Juma ‘a, Ḥāshiya, 67-68, 70-71, 185-186; Imām 
al-Ḥarāmayn al-Juwaynī, A Guide To The Conclusive Proofs For The Principles Of Belief: Kitāb 
al-irshād ilā qawāṭi‘ al-adilla fī uṣūl al-i‘tiqād  (Reading: Garnet Publishing, 2010), 147-149. 
Al-Zuḥaylī, Uṣūl, 1: 120-121, 124-126. A similar position is taken by the Athārī, see: Najm al-
Dīn al-Ṭūfī al-Ṣarṣarī,  Al-Ishārāt li-ilahiyya ilā al-mabāḥith al-uṣūliyya tafsīr al-qur’ān al-
‘aẓīm (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyyah, 2005), 389.
34 Also known as ethical subjectivism or divine command theory, on this see: Murphy, ibid, 100-
132; Philip L Quinn, Divine Commands And Moral Requirements (Oxford: Clarendon, 2003), 
66-88; Al-Attar, ibid, 75.
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wherein they accept rational ethics, placing worldly ethical obligation on all 
humans, but retaining the position that eschatological responsibility is only 
attained through revelation.35 But these opinions first of all center around re-
sponsibility in relation to judgement in the hereafter. How is one judged on 
earth? Here the question on the relation between faith and works comes in 
to play. Can one be a wrongdoer in relation to God, i.e. an unbeliever or poly-
theist, and at the same time be a rightdoer in relation to other humans? And 
could one be a rightdoer in relation to God, i.e. a believer or monotheist, and 
at the same be a wrongdoer in relation to himself and others, i.e. a sinner and 
oppressor? It is this latter question which became a central topic in Sunnī the-
ology as a response to the Khawārij and Mu‘tazila whereby the Sunnī orthodox 
rejected the concept that faith, as it is located in the heart, can be annihilated 
by works. The Mu‘tazila adhered to universal rational knowledge of belief and 
ethics, but because they emphasized monotheism and the collapse of faith 
and works, it also meant a collapse of worldly and eschatological punishment. 
Unbelief becomes the main cause of divine wrath both in the hereafter and 
here on earth.36 For the group which became known as the people of the pro-
phetic tradition and community (Ahl al-sunna wa-l-jamā‘, i.e. Sunnī orthodox), 
encompassing Māturīdī, Ash‘arī, and moderate Atharī, a clear separation be-
tween faith (’īmān) and works (a‘māl) was upheld.37 And it is this separation 
35 Anver Emon labels this semi-moral realism as soft natural law. A similar development can 
also be discerned with the Atharī. An important voluntarist tool to apply this semi-moral 
realism are the “objectives of the Sharī‘a (maqāṣid al-sharī‘a).” Emon, Islamic Natural Law 
Theories, 123-183; Reinhart, ibid, 62-76, 87-104; Al-Attar, ibid, 135-140; Farfūr, ibid, 67-72; Mari-
am al-Attar, “Meta-Ethics: A Quest For An Epistemological Basis Of Morality In Classical 
Islamic Thought”,  Journal Of Islamic Ethics  1/1-2 (2017), 39-47; Akgündüz,  ibid, 213-216; Ibn 
Isḥāq al-Shāṭibī, Al-muwāfaqāt fī uṣūl al-sharī‘a (Mansoura: Dār al-Ghadd al-Jadīd, 2011), 1: 
63-65; Rami Koujah, “Divine Purposiveness And Its Implications In Legal Theory: The Inter-
play Of Kalām And Uṣūl Al-Fiqh”,  Islamic Law And Society  24/3 (2017): 171-210; Ibn Kamāl 
Bāshā, Masā’il; Al-Maṭrafī, Al-‘aqā’idiyyat wa tafsīr, 436-444.
36 Cf. Sophia Vasalou,  Moral Agents And Their Deserts: The Character Of Mu’tazilite Ethics 
(Princeton University Press, 2008). The Shī‘a and Ibāḍī (sub-sect of the Khawārij) adopted 
the majority of the positions taken by the Mu‘tazila (and used Mu‘tazila exegesis as tem-
plates for their own tafsīr works), cf. Martin J MacDermott,  The Theology Of Al-Shaikh 
Al-Mufīd  (Beyrouth: Dar el-Machreq, 1986); Valerie J Hoffman,  The Essentials Of Ibadi Is-
lam (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2012); Abdul-Raof, Theological approaches to 
Qur’anic exegesis, 37-53.
37 Ibn Abī al-’Izz, ibid, 283-311; Imam al-Haramayn al-Juywani, A Guide To Conclusive Proofs For 
The Principles Of Belief: Kitab Al-Irshad Ila Qawati Al-Adilla Fi Usul Attiqad, Paul E. Walker 
trans. (United Kingdom: Garnet Publishing, 2001), 209-215; Al-Mazīdī, Shurūḥ wa ḥawāshī, 5: 
3-65; Wilferd Madelung, “Early Sunni Doctrine Concerning Faith As Reflected In The ‘Kitab 
Al-Iman’ Of Abu ‘Ubayd Al-Qasim B. Sallam (D. 224/839)”, Studia Islamica 32 (1970): 233-254.
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which also affects their understanding if unbelievers, despite their unbelief, 
can perform ethical works. If faith is not affected by works, then works are 
not necessarily affected by faith. Thereby also possibly separating worldly and 
eschatological punishment. Does unbelief clouds one’s vision on ethics? The 
Mu‘tazila view knowledge of monotheism (tawḥīd) as primary to knowledge of 
ethics, as ethics are derived from the knowledge of the just attributes of God, 
therefore a clouding in belief necessarily means a clouding in ethics.38 For the 
Sunnī orthodox, because there is a separation between faith and works, there 
is only a possible and not a necessary relation between them. (See Table 1. be-
low together with the main theological schools and their positions concern-
ing faith and works). Confronted with the belief in rational access to ethics, 
and that some cultures and minority groups follow earlier revealed religions, 
Islamic philosophy of law, especially among the Ḥanafī, developed the hypo-
thetical question pertaining to “the rulings of things before the advent of reve-
lation (aḥkām al-ashiyā’ qabla majī’ al-sama‘)” to discuss the minimal ethical and 
legal responsibilities Muslims can expect from non-Muslims when it comes 
to treaties, trade, and social cohesion and the rule of law.39 This defined what 
is known by reason alone (general belief in and gratitude to the creator (shukr 
al-mun‘im), upholding justice (‘adl), goodness (iḥsān) and equity (inṣāf), and 
eradication of injustice (maḥwa al-ẓulm)40), and what is part of all revelations 
(specific belief in God, specific requirements for worship, belief in judgement 
day and the hereafter, pursuing human interests (maṣāliḥ), guarding the five 
universals/objectives of the revealed law (kulliyāt/maqāṣid al-sharī‘a) 41, obliga-
tion of vows, and punishments for murder, fornication, and theft).42 
38 ‘Abd al-Jabbār, Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa, 64; Reinhart, ibid, 139-141.
39 Reinhart, ibid, 3-9.
40 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Uṣūl, 2: 100; Al-Lāmishī, Kitāb, 66; Reinhart, ibid, 19; Khazna, Taṭawwur al-fikr al-
uṣūlī Ḥanafī, 346-347, 354-355; Anver M Emon, Religious Pluralism And Islamic Law (Oxford: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 2014), 79-86.
41 On kulliyāt/maqāṣid al-sharī‘a, see: Al-Zuḥaylī,  Uṣūl, 2: 307-323; Jasser Auda,  Maqāṣid Al-
Sharīʻah As Philosophy Of Islamic Law: A Systems Approach (London: International Institute 
of Islamic Thought, 2007). On the maqāṣid being part of all major religions, see: Aḥmad b. 
‘Alī Abī al-Ḍayā‘ Ibn al-Sā‘ātī, Nihāyat al-wuṣūl ilā ‘ilm al-uṣūl (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmi-
yyah, 2004), 261.
42 Emon,  ibid, 106-108; Shāh Walī Allāh al-Dahlawī,  Ḥujjat Allāh Al-Bāligha  (Damascus: Dār 
Ibn Kathīr, 2010), 1: 294-309; Abū Bakr Aḥmad b. ‘Umar Al-Khaṣṣāf and ‘Umar b. ‘Abd Al-
‘Azīz, Sharḥ Adab Al-Qāḍī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyyah, 1994), 495-497.
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An interesting early example of the ethical expectations placed on non-Mus-
lims is by Muḥammad al-Shaybānī (d. 189/805), the most productive student of 
Abū Ḥanīfa, in his discussions on international law (siyar):
“If a [non-Muslim] ruler seeks an agreement of security (dhimma) and that 
he should be left free to rule the people of his kingdom as he likes by kil-
ling people, crucifying them and other acts that are not deemed suitable (lā 
yaṣluḥ) for the people of [the territory of ] Islam, this will not be accepted. If 
the agreement of truce (ṣulḥ) or guarantee is provided on these conditions, 
it will be void (bāṭil) [because] it is not lawful in Islam.”49
The Ḥanafī scholar Abū al-Thanā Maḥmūd al-Lāmishī (d. 539/1144) discusses 
if non-Muslims are responsible, after receiving the call of the prophet (i.e. after 
bulūgh al-da‘wa has been fulfilled), for all the specific or general rulings of the 
Sharī‘a50, after which he states:
“[The non-Muslims] are addressed in the inviolable matters (al-ḥurumāt)51 
and social affairs (al-mu‘āmalāt) apart from the matters of worship (al-‘ibā-
dāt), because the people of worship are the believers apart from the unbe-
lievers. As for the unbelievers, they are a people with legal capacity (ah-
lun)52 in [upholding and receiving] the permanent inviolability (li-thubūt 
al-ḥurma) in rights (ḥaqqahu) and social affairs.”53
49 Abū Bakr al-Sarakhsī, Al-mabsūṭ (Beirut: Dār al-Ma‘rifa, 1993), 10: 85. 
50 Specific: they are held responsible in the hereafter for failing to perform all the specific rul-
ings revealed by Islamic revelations (such as fulfilling worship through the five prayers). This 
position was, according to al-Lāmishī, adhered to by the Ḥanafī from Iraq, all the Mu‘tazila, 
and ‘people of Ḥadīth (i.e. Ḥanbalī)’. See also: Khazna, Taṭawwur al-fikr al-uṣūlī Ḥanafī, 371-
373. General: they are held responsible in the hereafter for performing any general principle 
form (aṣl) of ethics and worship, known by reason/human nature, as a way to “thank the 
benefactor”. This position was, according to al-Lāmishī, adhered to by the Ḥanafī from Tran-
soxania. See also: Khazna, Taṭawwur al-fikr al-uṣūlī Ḥanafī, 374-377. For larger discussions on 
if humans are responsible for all or only general rulings, see: Al-Dabūsī, Taqwīm, 437-443; A. 
Kevin Reinhart, “Failures Of Practice Or Failures Of Faith: Are Non-Muslims Subject To The 
Sharia?”, in Between Heaven And Hell: Islam, Salvation, And The Fate Of Others  (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 13-34.
51 These include murder (qatl), injuring others (jurḥ), and adultery (zinā). Al-Taftāzānī, Sharḥ 
al-talwīḥ, 2: 423-424.
52 The juristic definition of ahliyya has many similarities to the term dhimma and refers to 
“competent humans who have an obligation towards legal right-claims (li-wujūb al-ḥuqūq 
al-mashrū‘a), ]whereby the rights-claim are made[ by them or ]are claimed by others[ upon 
them.” ‘Abd al-Karīm b. ‘Alī al-Namla,  Al-Shāmil fī ḥudūd ta‘rīfāt muṣṭalaḥāt ‘ilm uṣūl al-
fiqh (Riyad: Maktabat al-Rushd, 2009), 1: 208.
53 Al-Lāmishī, Kitāb, 105.
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Non-Muslims are in this world accountable for their ethical works, but their 
failure to fulfill the obligation of worship will be dealt with in the hereaf-
ter.54 This shows that the separation of faith and works was also applied to 
non-Muslims and has implications not only for the time after the sending of 
the prophet Muḥammad, but also raises questions on the times before it. Did 
God destroy the peoples mentioned in the prophetic tales for their idolatry 
and unbelief, and/or injustice towards other humans (or themselves)? The dif-
ferent positions taken towards universal ethics and divine respite in relation to 
the prophetic tales (qiṣaṣ al-anbiyā’) show the further development and impli-
cations of the separation of faith and works and what is deemed reasonable 
responsibility, and will be one of the central typologies defining Sunnī theol-
ogy and the unique characteristics of Ottoman thought with its emphasis on 
Māturīdī theology.
Divine punishment and prophetic tales (qiṣaṣ al-anbiyā’) 
Of the more than 6000 verses in the Qur’ān, around 1400 of them have pro-
phetic tales or punishment-narratives as its subject.55 These tales were central 
both in Islamic theology, as in general Muslim culture as shown by its own spe-
cific literary genre.56 These narratives mostly discuss the fate of earlier peoples 
in relation to their works and unbelief in their prophets. But these narratives 
are not only to be understood as providing sacred history, for the Islamic tradi-
tion they also provide an anthropology. According to David Marshall and Rob-
ert Tottoli the punishment-narratives provide an exposition of God’s response 
to unbelief.57 This assumption is logical as the main shared message between 
all these prophets is that they proclaimed monotheism (Q.7:59, 21:25 etc.), and 
that God only punishes after sending a messenger (Q.6:131, 17:15, 28:59). A sim-
ilar stance is discernible among several, mainly early, exegetes of the Qur’ān, 
especially at key verses discussing the punishment-narratives, such as Q.6:131, 
54 Mullājiyūn al-Ḥanafī, Nūr al-anwār, 1: 194-196; Al-Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-talwīḥ, 1: 402-408; Nya-
zee, Islamic Legal Maxims, 108-109; Khazna, Taṭawwur al-fikr al-uṣūlī Ḥanafī, 364.
55 David Marshall,  God, Muhammad And The Believers: A Qur’anic Study (Richmond: Curzon, 
1999), 31.
56 Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad Thaʻlabī and William M. Brinner, ʻArāʻis al-Majālis fī Qiṣaṣ Al-Anbiyā, 
or «Lives of the Prophets» (Leiden: Brill, 2002), xi-xxx; Muḥammad ibn ʻAbd Allāh Kisāʼī and 
W. M. Thackston, The Tales Of The Prophets Of Al-Kisaʼi (Boston: Twayne, 1978), xii-xxxiv; 
Roberto Tottoli,  Biblical Prophets in the Qurʼān and Muslim Literature (London: Routledge, 
2009), 165-196.
57 Marshall, ibid, 65; Tottoli, ibid, 6.
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8:54, 11:100-117, 17:15-16/56-59, 18:59, 28:59, 29:31/40, and 46:25-27. An example of 
early exegesis on verse Q.11:117 is that by the early exegete Muqātil b. Sulaymān 
(d. 150/767)58:
“{And God does not destroy} meaning punish the communities in this 
world (al-dunyā) {unjustly (bi-ẓulm)}, meaning, [He would not destroy 
them] without any sin (‘alā ghayri dhanb), meaning, the communities which 
God the Exalted has mentioned in this chapter [i.e. sūrat al-Hud] which 
God had punished, and they were the people of Noah, and [the people of ] 
‘Ād, Thamūd, the people of Abraham, the people of Lot, and the people 
of Shu‘ayb. Then He says {people who are rightdoers} meaning believers. 
He is saying: if they were believers they would not have been destroyed.”59
The proposed interpretation is clear, God would not destroy them without 
them having performed any sin, which includes their unbelief. Similar exege-
sis is proposed by other early scholars, especially among the Mu‘tazila.60 God 
being transcendent of any injustice is a central position in Islamic thought and 
emphasized multiple times in the Qur’ān itself (Q.3:117, 4:40, 10:44, 16:33, 18:49). 
The destruction is brought upon by the people themselves due to their own 
sins, as they have done injustice to themselves (ẓalamū anfusahum Q.3:117/135, 
4:64, 9:70, 11:101, 14:45, 30:9, 34:19). And with each prophetic tale, apart from 
their idolatry and rejection of the messengers, specific sins (bi-dhanb Q.6:6, 
29:40) are mentioned such as the oppression and persecution of the people of 
Israel by Pharaoh (Q.8:54), the killing of the camel by the Thamūd (Q.11:65-66), 
and the violation of rights by the ‘Ād (Q.41:15).61 So there are three possible 
violations by the people mentioned in the punishment-narratives:
  i. idolatry (shirk)
 ii. giving the lie to (takdhīb) and/or unbelief/rejection (kufr) in the messengers/
prophets
iii. ethical violations towards other humans (ẓulm)
58 On Muqātil, see: Cf. Nicolai Sinai, “The Qur’anic Commentary Of Muqātil B. Sulaymān And 
The Evolution Of Early Tafsīr Literature”, in Tafsīr And Islamic Intellectual History: Exploring 
The Boundaries Of A Genre (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 113-143; Al-Banjabīrī, 
Ṭabaqāt almufassirīn, 56-57; Nuwayhiḍ, Mu‘jam al-mufassirīn, 682-683.
59 Muqātil b. Sulaymān, Tafsīr Muqātil b. Sulaymān (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyyah, 2003), 2: 135.
60 Abū ‘Alī al-Jubā’ī, Tafsīr Abū ‘alī al-Jubā’ī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyyah, 2007), 229; Al-Ṭa-
barsī,  Al-tibyān, 4: 284-285. On al-Jubā’ī, see: Al-Banjabīrī, Ṭabaqāt al-mufassirīn, 119; Nu-
wayhiḍ, Mu‘jam al-mufassirīn, 570.
61 For overviews of the prophetic tales within the Qur’ān, see: Tottoli, ibid, 17-70; Marshall, ibid, 
39-153; Al-Qaṭṭān, Mabāḥith, 279-284; Ṣalāḥ al-Khālidī, Al-qaṣaṣ al-qur’āniyyu ‘arḍu wa qā’i‘ 
wa taḥlīl aḥdath (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 1998), 1: 77ff.
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Do all three violations need to be present in a people for them to be pun-
ished, and if not, which violation or combination of violations, triggers divine 
wrath on earth and which are given respite? The answers to these questions 
revolve around our earlier analysis on the separation between faith and works: 
can reason can create responsibility, and can a hierarchy of values can be dis-
cerned through these? The Qur’ān itself mentions idolatry, murder, and adul-
tery as belonging to the major sins deserving punishment (Q.25:68) and singles 
out idolatry as the only unforgivable sin (Q.4:48). But there are multiple vers-
es mentioning respite until the day of judgement and God desiring religious 
pluralism on earth (Q.2:213, 5:48, 10:19, 11:118, 16:93, 42:8). As is stated in Q.11:57, 
human unbelief cannot hurt God. God is self-sufficient and free from want (al-
Ghanī Q.3:97, 4:131/170, 6:133, 14:8, 27:40, 31:12) and in no need of His creation. As 
Muqātil comments at Q.6:133 “{and your Lord is self-sufficient} of the worship 
of His creation.”62 A point which Marshall also emphasizes:
“In the Bible sin and unbelief set God a problem which is not simply re-
solved […] In contrast […] the God of the Qur’an is unaffected by sin and 
unbelief and there is a serene simplicity in his triumph over them. A ne-
cessary dimension of this simplicity is the absence of any sense of tragedy 
in God’s experience of the world. This absence is reflected succinctly but 
powerfully in a group of passages of which the following is typical: ‘And 
Moses said, “If you disbelieve, you and everyone on the earth, yet assuredly 
God is self-sufficient, laudable”’[…] The Arabic word translated ‘self-suffi-
cient’ here is ghanī, literally ‘rich’, but suggestive of the ability to do without 
others […] The implication here is that in this encounter with unbelief, as 
in all other matters, the divine omnipotence does not experience any prob-
lem, and certainly no occasion for lamentation.”63 
We can therefore conclude that seemingly from a Qur’ānic theological per-
spective, idolatry and unbelief by itself are not the main causes for divine 
worldly punishment. But what after a prophet or messenger is sent, do their 
warnings and knowledge make one acquire a responsibility (taklīf) which de-
serves both worldly and eschatological punishment? According to the early 
Kharājite scholar Hūd Muḥakkam b. Hūd al-Hawārī (d. 220/835?)64, in his ex-
62 Muqātil, Tafsīr, 1: 371. This is the dominant interpretation throughout the Sunnī tafsīr tradi-
tion on this part of this verse.
63 Marshall, ibid, 87-88.
64 On al-Hawārī, see: Al-Maṭrafī, Al-‘aqā’idiyyat wa tafsīr, 656-658; Nuwayhiḍ, Mu‘jam al-mu-
fassirīn, 713.
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egesis on Q.6:131, rejection of the messengers deserves worldly punishment: 
“[God] destroyed all of the preceding nations when they belied their messen-
gers.”65 And this is seemingly the implied meaning of the verse when it states 
{your Lord does not destroy the communities unjustly while the people 
were heedless}, which presents a similar argument as Q.17:15 and Q.28:59.66 
But these verses were generally understood as promising respite (imhāl) until 
the day of judgement as the prophet Muḥammad was sent to the whole of 
mankind (Q.34:28), and, as discussed above, God also wills religious pluralism 
on earth. Non-Muslims were accepted as citizens within the Islamic empire, 
and were deemed as communities with rights.67 These communities were 
clearly exposed to the message of Islam (fulfilling the requirement of bulūgh 
al-da‘wa), and several of them had made treaties with Muḥammad himself.68 
So idolatry and unbelief were not only tolerated, their existence was divinely 
mandated and protected. Taking in these realities, together with the concept 
that divine convention (sunnat Allāh) concerning these matters do not change 
(Q.33:38/62, 35:43, 40:85, 48:23), resulted in a belief that the punishment for 
idolatry and unbelief were deemed eschatological.69 This leaves us then with 
connecting the underlying cause of the punishment-narratives to ethical vio-
lations. If violations in faith are ignored on earth, but violations in ethics are 
not, then we can determine both the separation and hierarchical difference 
between faith and works. And it is this interpretation which is slowly adopt-
ed in the exegesis on verses as Q.6:131 and Q.11:117. These verses were seen, by 
the overall exegetical tradition, as the key verses discussing the causes behind 
divine worldly punishment. This development within the exegetical tradition 
65 Hūd Muḥakkam b. Hūd al-Hawārī, Tafsīr kitāb Allāh al-‘azīz (Beirut: Dār al-Gharab al-Islām, 
1990), 1: 561.
66 Q.28:59 is generally understood to be directly referring to Mecca {mother of the cities} after 
the sending of Muḥammad {messenger} and the Qur’ān {verses recited to them}, whereby 
the latter part of the verse {He will not destroy the communities except when its people 
do wrong} referred to their totality of belying of Muḥammad and the persecution of the 
believers. The verse was therefore mostly understood through the biography of the prophet, 
something we do not see with Q.11:117. Cf. Muqātil, Tafsīr, 2: 502; SQ, 959.
67 Cf. Labeeb Ahmed Bsoul, International Treaties (Muʻāhadāt) In Islam: Theory And Practice In 
The Light Of Islamic International Law (Siyar) According To Orthodox Schools (Lanham: Uni-
versity Press of America, 2008), 52-67, 132-136. Emon, Religious Pluralism, 97-105.
68 Cf. John Andrew Morrow, The Covenants Of The Prophet Muhammad With The Christians Of 
The World (USA: Angelico Press, 2013).
69 Linking divine respite to divine convention is mainly done in modern exegesis, starting with 
Muḥammad ‘Abdūh (d. 1905), whereby divine convention is interpreted from an Enlighten-
ment concept of ‘natural law’ and ‘law of nations’.
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reflects the development of the foundational principles adopted and defend-
ed by what became known as the Sunnī orthodox. 
Divine punishment and respite in the tafsīr tradition
An early representation of this development can be seen in the exegesis on 
Q.11:117 by the early grammarian Yaḥyā b. Ziyād al-Farrā’ (d. 207/822)70:
“It is saying (yaqūlu): It is not that He destroys them while they are right-
doers, because that would be unjust (ẓulm). And it could [also] be saying 
(yuqālu): It is not that He destroys them while they give [others] the right in 
what is between them (al-ḥaqq fīmā baynahum) while they are polytheists 
(mushrikīn) and [practice] the wrongdoing of idolatry (al-ẓulm al-shirk).”71 
Here, al-Farrā’ begins with the similar interpretation as provided by Muqātil 
and others by emphasizing God’s transcendence over injustice. But al-Farrā’ 
also introduces here another interpretation72, which shifts the agent of the in-
justice or wrongdoing (ẓulm) to the people of the communities. This shift has 
major implications for the overall meaning of the verse, and for the possible 
theology presented by it. In this interpretation God will not destroy the people 
of the communities for their idolatry, and He will not destroy them as long 
as they uphold justice between them and others. In this scheme, violations 
in faith are given divine respite, but violations in ethics are not. He thereby 
acknowledges that non-Muslims, even polytheists, can know and uphold eth-
ics in a satisfactory way, despite their unbelief. Al-Farrā’is the earliest exegete 
which provides this interpretation, and is also is one of the earliest exegetes 
70 On al-Farrā’, see: Doğan, History Of The Methodology, 137-138; Mustafa Shah, “Exploring The 
Genesis Of Early Arabic Linguistic Thought: Qur’anic Readers And Grammarians Of The Kū-
fan Tradition (Part I)”, Journal Of Qur’anic Studies 5/1 (2003): 50, 55-59; Maḥmūd, Manāhij 
al-mufassirīn, 23-28; Al-Banjabīrī, Ṭabaqāt al-mufassirīn, 87; Nuwayhiḍ,  Mu‘jam al-mufas-
sirīn, 729-730.
71 Yaḥyā b. Ziyād al-Farrā’, Ma‘ānī al-qur’ān (Egypt: Dār al-Miṣriyat li-l-Tā’līf wa-l-Tarjima, 
2010), 2: 31. 
72 The use of yuqālu can be understood to imply an exegesis based on less directly implied, or 
less logical or traditional footing than a reading introduced with yaqūlu.  But in these early 
forms of exegesis, there was no systematic application of these terms, although some used 
yuqālu to introduce alternative readings. Cf. Cornelis H. M Versteegh, Arabic Grammar And 
Qur’ānic Exegesis In Early Islam (Leiden: Brill, 1993), 115. I have also not seen a clear systematic 
use of it by al-Farrā’, but here it is best to be understood as the first exegesis introduced with 
yuqālu implying a literal linguistic reading (God does not do ẓulm), and the second exege-
sis introduced with yuqālu proposing an implied theological reading (God does not respond 
with ẓulm to their theological ẓulm).
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adhering to the positions for which the later Sunnī orthodox became known.73 
We see this interpretive attribution also clearly with the Ḥanafī scholar Abū 
al-Layth al-Samarqandī (d. 375/985)74, who directly refers to both Ibn ‘Abbās 
and al-Farrā’75: 
“He [God] said: {And He will not destroy the communities because of 
wrongdoing}, He is saying your Lord does not punish (li-yu‘adhdhab) the 
people of the communities, {bi-ẓulm} means: without any crime (jurm), {wa 
ahluhā muṣliḥūna} means: obedient monotheists (muwaḥadīn muṭī‘yīn). 
And it is related from Ibn ‘Abbās saying: ‘God doesn’t destroy a people 
except by their acts (bi-a‘malihim), and He does not destroy them because 
of idolatry (shirk).’ Meaning: He does not destroy them because of their 
idolatry while they are rightdoers and do not do wrong to others, because 
idolatry is compensated in the hellfire (al-nār) and nowhere else. God only 
destroys them because of their transgressions added (ziyāda) to their idol-
atry, such as [with] the people of Ṣāliḥ by wounding the she-camel, and 
the people of Lot by acting wickedly, and the people of Shu‘ayb by deval-
uing the weight and measure, and the people of Pharoah by torturing Mo-
ses and the tribe of Israel. And it could be saying (yuqālu) {and your Lord 
does not destroy the communities because of wrongdoing while they 
are rightdoers}, meaning: and in them [i.e. the communities] someone is 
calling towards the good and forbids the bad. And al-Farrā’ said: He will 
73 There is also a tafsīr work attributed to the prophetic companion Ibn ‘Abbās (d. 68/688) 
which mentions these exegetical positions, but as there are logical issues with this attri-
bution it cannot be claimed to be the earliest tafsīr applying it. It is therefore possible that 
al-Farrā’’s exegesis on Q.6:131 and 11:117 is relating theological and exegetical positions which 
are viewed as being from the school of Ibn ‘Abbās (and which was known for its ijtihādi ap-
proach to exegesis). For the attributed exegesis (which some also see as collected notes 
of his students), see: ‘Abd Allāh Ibn ‘Abbās, Tanwīr al-miqbās min tafsīr Ibn ‘Abbās (Beirut: 
Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyyah, 1992), 156. For the problems surrounding these attributed works, 
see: Gilliot, ibid, 9-13; Andrew Rippin, “Ibn ‘Abbās’s Al-Lughāt fī’l-Qur’ān” and “Ibn ‘Abbās’s 
Gharīb al-Qur’ān”, in The Qur’an: Formative Interpretation (USA: Ashgate, 1999), 109-122; Ab-
dul-Raof, Schools of Qur’anic Exegesis, 14, 17-19. I agree with Edmund Beck that al-Farrā’ has 
been wrongly labeled as a Mu‘tazila by classical Islamic scholarship, as the position taken 
by al-Farrā’ here, and at other verses, clearly show a proto-Sunnī adherence. Cf. Edmund 
Beck, “The Dogmatic Religious Stance Of The Grammarian Yaḥyā Ibn Ziyād Al-Farrā’”, in The 
Qur’an: Formative Interpretation (USA: Ashgate, 1999), 137-158. Mustafa Shah also agrees 
with this position: Mustafa Shah, “Al-Ṭabarī And The Dynamics Of Tafsīr: Theological Dimen-
sions Of A Legacy”, Journal Of Qur’anic Studies 15/2 (2013), 87.
74 On al- Samarqandī and his exegesis, see: Al-Maṭrafī,  Al-‘aqā’idiyyat wa tafsīr, 689-690; 
Ḥaqqī, ‘ulūm al-qur’ān, 1: 297-306; Al-Banjabīrī, Ṭabaqāt al-mufassirīn, 140-141.
75 Al-Ṭabarī also cites al-Farrā’ anonymously in his exegesis on this verse. See: Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmi‘ 
al-bayān fī tā’wīl al- Qur’ān (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Risālah, 2000), 15: 530.
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not destroy them while they undertake the right in what is between them, 
while they are criminals [i.e. idolators].”76
From this exegesis we can deduce three different approaches towards the pun-
ishment-narratives:
  i. God is not unjust and therefore only destroys people for being disobedient 
in relation to faith.
 ii. God does not destroy people for their idolatry, as this is compensated in 
the hellfire (i.e. eschatological), but only destroys them when they perform 
ethical violations added to their unbelief, or separate from it.
iii. God will not destroy them as long they call towards the good and forbid the 
bad (i.e. they apply ḥisba).
Again, this exegesis begins with an emphasis on divine justice and the impor-
tance of correct faith. Which was clearly the dominant reading of this verse in 
the formative period. Al-Samarqandī provides an intersectional interpretation 
as possible (by using yuqāl) in relation to believers being destroyed by failing 
to apply ḥisba.77 But a secondary reading is provided which presents the sepa-
ration of faith and works as the true orthodox position as represented by Ibn 
‘Abbās78, the second most important exegetical authority within Sunnī Islam 
next to the Prophet.79 Thereby providing a clear traditional basis for al-Far-
rā’’s proposed exegesis, which al-Samarqandī partially cites at the end. No 
reference is provided by them for that ẓulm can be understood here as shirk, 
but it has a clear Qur’ānic basis in Q.31:13 {idolatry is a tremendous wrong 
(al-shirk la-ẓulm ‘aẓīm)} which is also cited in the prophetic exegesis on Q.6:82 
{do not clothe their belief with wrongdoing (lam yalbisū ’īmānihum bi-ẓulm)}. 
This interpretation of Q.6:82 was also used by the majority of later exegetes 
as an antithesis for the Mu‘tazila reading who understood ẓulm here as ma-
jor sins (kabā’īr), and therefore as proof for the eternal lost status of the unre-
76 Abū al-Layth al-Samarqandī,  Tafsīr al-Samarqandī aw baḥr al-‘ulūm (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub 
al-‘ilmiyyah, 1993), 2: 146.
77 On ḥisba, see: A. Kevin Reinhart, “Ethics and the Qur’ān” in Encyclopaedia of the Qur’ān, Jane 
Dammen McAuliffe Ed. (Leiden: Brill 2001), 2: 62-65.
78 I have seen no earlier source for this tradition. According to the Ash‘arīte exegete Abū al-
Ḥasan al-Wāḥidī (d. 468/1076), which is also cited later by Shī‘ite exegete Abū ‘Alī al-Faḍīl 
Al-Ṭabarsī (d. 548/1153), there is a similar reading from Ibn ‘Abbās by his student ‘Aṭā’ b. Abū 
Rabāḥ (d. 115/733). See: Abū al-Ḥasan ‘Alī b. Aḥmad al-Wāḥidī, Tafsīr al-basīṭ (Saudi-Arabia: 
‘imādat al-Baḥth al-‘ilmī, 2009), 11: 586-587; Abū ‘Alī al-Faḍīl b. al-Ḥassan al-Ṭabarsī, Majmu‘ 
al-bayān fī tafsīr al-qur’ān (Beirut: Dār al-‘ulūm, 2005), 5: 269.
79 Berg, ibid, 131-135.
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pentant fāsiq80. Although unstated by all commentaries (with the exception of 
Ebu’s-su‘ūd Efendi [d. 982/1574]81) it is undeniable that the prophetic exegesis 
on Q.6:82 explaining ẓulm as shirk was used analogically to interpret Q.6:131 
and 11:117 in a similar fashion: to separate īmān and a‘māl, and to provide an 
alternative to the Mu‘tazila reading. The exegetical precedence of Q.6:82 was 
used to project the (proto-)Sunnī theological developments unto the other two 
verses and shows how the development of orthodox Sunnī theology is reflect-
ed within the tafsīr tradition. These readings also show how Islamic theology 
developed towards viewing the punishment-narratives from providing a di-
chotomy between belief and unbelief, towards a dichotomy between good and 
bad works. There are multiple verses using derivatives of halaka (to destroy), 
ẓalama (to be unjust) or dhanaba (to sin) in relation to the punishment-narra-
tives, but it is only in Q.11:117 where halaka is combined with ẓalama and ṣalaḥa 
(to do right)82, whereby the unbelievers can be understood to not only being 
destroyed because they did wrong, as in Q.18:59 {We destroyed them for their 
wrongdoing (ahlaknāhum lammā ẓalamū)}83, but also as not being destroyed 
because they did right. This latter element became a theological ground for 
Sunnism in its adherence to the hierarchical dominance of ethics over belief. 
80 Al- Ṣāwī says: “]…] it is meant here as shirk ]…] And this opinion is what is adhered to by the 
ahl al-Sunna, while the Mu‘tazila adhere to the opinion that {bi-l-ẓulm} in this verse is in-
tended as sinning (al-ma‘ṣiyya) and not shirk.’ Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Ṣāwī, Ḥāshiya al-‘alā-
ma al-Ṣāwī ‘alā tafsīr al-Jalālayn (Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, n.dt.), 2: 26. For other Sunnī responses to 
the Mu‘tazila reading, see: Al-Qūnawī, Ḥāshiyat Al-Qūnawī, 8: 174; Al-Sakūnī, al-Tamyīz limā 
awda‘hu al-Zamakhsharī, 2: 176-177; Quṭb al-Dīn Maḥmūd’s ḥāshiya in al-Zamakhsharī, ibid, 
fn.3; Sulaymān b. ‘Umar al-‘ajīlī al-Jamal, Al-futūḥāt al-ilahiyyat bi-tawḍīḥ tafsīr al-Jalālayn 
li-l-daqā’īq al-khafiyya (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyyah, 2013), 2: 388-389; Al-Ṣarṣarī, Al-Is-
hārāt li-ilahiyya, 254. For the typical Mu‘tazila reading of this verse, see: Al-Jubā’ī, Tafsīr, 215-
216; Al-Zamaksharī, al-Kashshāf, 2: 40; Abū Ja‘far b. al-Ḥassan al-Ṭabarsī, Al-tibyān fī tafsīr 
al-qur’ān  (Beirut: Dār iḥyā’ al-Turāth al-‘Arabiyya, n.dt.), 4: 190-191. Al-Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār 
seemingly tries to reconcile the popular prophetic exegesis with the general Mu‘tazila read-
ing by stating that: “Of all the sins many are included in ẓulm, therefore the Exalted says 
{as idolatry is a tremendous wrong (Q.31:13)}. Al-Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār, Tanzīh al-qur’ān ‘an 
al-muṭā‘in (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyyah, 2008), 171.
81 With one interesting exception: Ebu’s-su‘ūd Efendi (d. 982/1574) in his exegesis on 11:117 ex-
plains {bi-ẓulm} with multabasā “to clothe” which is used in verse 6: 82. Ebu’s-su‘ūd Efen-
di, Tafsīr Abū Su‘ūd aw Irshād al-‘aql al-salīm ilā mazāyā al-kitāb al-karīm (Quetta: Maktaba 
al-Ma‘rūfiyya, 2011), 3: 359. And Ebu’s-su‘ūd is cited by: Al-Jamal, Al-futūḥāt, 3: 485; Muḥam-
mad al-Amīn al-Harirī, Tafsīr ḥadā’īq al-rūḥ wa al-rīḥān fī rawābī ‘ulūm al-qur’ān (Beirut: Dār 
Ṭawq al-Najāh, 2001), 13: 271.
82 For all occurrences in the Qur’ān of halaka and its derivatives, see: Muḥammad Fuād ‘Abd 
al-Bāqī, Al-mu‘jam al-muhfaris li-alfāẓ al-qur’ān al-karīm (Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, n.dt.), 737-738.
83 Cf. Q.14:13, 22:45, 28:59, and 29:31.
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From the mentioned exegetical works we can discern two main approaches to 
Q.11:117 within the general tafsīr tradition: 
A. God does not punish unjustly (bi-ẓulm) people who are correct (ahluhā 
muṣliḥūn) in their faith (imān) nor is His punishment towards unbelievers 
unjust as they have called it upon themselves by being theologically unjust 
through their unbelief (i.e. they perform vertical ẓulm). 
B. God doesn’t punish people for their theological injustice (bi-ẓulm) of poly-
theism (shirk) or unbelief (kufr), if they are people who perform ethical 
goodness (ahluhā muṣliḥūn) and are therefore not unjust towards others 
(i.e. their vertical ẓulm is ignored if they do not perform horizontal ẓulm). 
Figure 1. Two interpretive approaches to Q.11:117 ã Arnold Mol
Q.11:117 therefore lies at the center of two different theologies each with their 
own anthropologies, as theology and anthropology are unmistakingly inter-
twined.84 Both readings see God as just, but reading (A) presents a theology 
wherein God takes revenge on humans violating His personal rights regarding 
monotheism and worship, thereby presenting an anthropology whereby hu-
mans are first and foremost defined by their unbelief. Reading (B) presents a 
84 Gordon D. Kaufman, “Theology As Imaginative Construction”,  Journal Of The American 
Academy Of Religion 50/1 (1982): 74-79.
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theology wherein God takes revenge on humans violating the rights of other 
humans, thereby presenting an anthropology whereby humans are first and 
foremost defined by their ethics. 
Q.11:117 and its main readings as epitomized by  
Zamakhsharī, Rāzī, and Bayḍāwī
In the classical period the (B) reading is adopted as the dominant interpreta-
tion representing the Sunnī orthodox, as stated by the Ash‘arīte exegete Abū 
al-Ḥasan al-Wāḥidī (d. 468/1076)85:
“Abū Bakr al-Anbārī86 said: He intents with the communities its people 
and its residences and mentions its people after it in His statement {and its 
people} exposing for what they not include. The exegetes and the people 
of meaning [i.e. the linguists] mention two statements on this verse: 1) And 
God does not destroy the people of the communities and they are rightdo-
ing Muslims (muslimūn ṣālihūn), as that would be wrongdoing from Him 
[directed] towards them. 2) And the ahl al-Sunna say [this verse is read as]: 
that your Lord does not destroy the people of the communities because 
of their idolatry and them doing wrong to themselves, and they are right-
doers undertaking the right between them. Meaning [the destruction] is 
not [caused by them being] from the way of the unbelievers - when they 
pursue the right in the social affairs (al-mu‘āmala) and they avoid wrong-
doing. That God sends down punishment to them annihilating them, and 
the meaning of this [is provided] through a saying from Ibn ‘Abbās in a 
narration from ‘Aṭṭā’87: ‘{and your Lord does not destroy the communi-
ties} intending the people, {bi-ẓulm} intending because of idolatry and {its 
people are rightdoers} intending in what between them, such as with the 
people of Lot He punished them for sodomy, and He said about them {and 
85 On al-Wāḥidī and his exegetical methodology and works, cf. Walid A. Saleh, “The Last Of 
The Nishapuri School Of Tafsīr: Al-Wāḥidī (D. 468/1076) And His Significance In The History 
Of Qur’anic Exegesis”, Journal Of The American Oriental Society 126/2 (2006): 223-243; Walid 
A. Saleh, “The Introduction To Wāḥidī’s Al-Basīṭ: An Edition, Translation And Commentary”, 
in Aims, Methods And Contexts Of Qur’anic Exegesis (2Nd/8Th-9Th/15Th C.) (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 67-100; Ḥaqqī,  ‘ulūm al-qur’ān, 1: 331-340; Al-Banjabīrī, Ṭabaqāt 
al-mufassirīn, 176-177.
86 This is the grammarian Abū Bakr Ibn al-Anbārī (d. 328/939), author of the linguistic work 
Kitāb al-aḍdād, see: Al-Banjabīrī, Ṭabaqāt al-mufassirīn, 132; Nuwayhiḍ,  Mu‘jam al-mufas-
sirīn, 704-705. 
87 On the tābi‘ī ‘Aṭṭā b. Abū Rabāḥ (d. 114/732), see: Al-Banjabīrī, Ṭabaqāt al-mufassirīn, 45.
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before they had being acting evil (Q.11:78)} intending idolatry, and such as 
the people of Shu‘ayb were punished for devaluing the measure.’ And this 
exegesis proves that the insolence of [performing these different] types of 
sinful rebellions are nearer towards the punishment of eradication in the 
world [compared to] idolatry.”88
This development in the classical period shifts reading (B) from being a weak 
or minority reading in the pre-classical period, towards being the dominant 
reading adopted by the Sunnī orthodox (represented by its linkage to Ibn 
Abbas). Making (B) into the typological Sunnī orthodox reading had a direct 
consequence for reading (A): it became to be viewed as the typological read-
ing of the Mu‘tazila, the main opponents of the kalāmic Sunnī orthodox.89 
That readings (A) and (B) revolved around the separation of faith and works 
can also be seen in an important term al-Wāḥidī introduces: the communities 
were destroyed because of their failures in social affairs (al-mu‘āmala), thereby 
excluding faith (which falls under the category al-‘ibādāt, worship) and private 
sins (which fall under works but do not harm anyone except the sinner him-
self, which therefore are categorized by being pious works (diyāna)) as causes 
for worldly punishment.90 We then enter the true mature phase of the tafsīr 
tradition with the Mu‘tazilite al-Zamakhsharī, whose Kashshāf became central 
in the overall tafsīr tradition mainly for its strong linguistic interpretations.91 
With the rising dominance of the (B) reading in the classical period, he also 
mentions it as a secondary interpretation which we have highlighted in bold92: 
“This is with the meaning of truth and uprightness. And the lām [in li-yuh-
lik] is to confirm the denial. And the {bi-ẓulm} is the condition of the agent 
(ḥāl min al-fā‘il), and its meaning is that it is impossible (istaḥāl) from divine 
88 Al-Wāḥidī, Tafsīr al-basīṭ, 11: 586-587.
89 Al-Sakūnī, al-Tamyīz limā awda‘hu al-Zamakhsharī, 2: 341.
90 On the dichotomy of mu‘āmalāt and ‘ibādāt, see: Emon, Religious Pluralism, 78.
91 For a discussion on this, see: Rufaydah, Al-naḥw wa kutub al-tafsīr, 2: 681-741.
92 According to Andrew Lane, al-Zamakhsharī’s exegesis does not strictly adhere to Mu‘tazilite 
principles, while Kifayat Ullah’s analysis shows the ways it does conforms to the Mu‘tazi-
lite five principles (uṣūl al-khamsa). As al-Zamakhsharī mentions reading (B), which con-
tradicts many of these five principles, it can be assumed that his theological positions as 
taken within his tafsīr work probably lies in the middle of these two extremes. On this, and 
al-Zamakhsharī in general, cf. Andrew J Lane, A Traditional Mu`tazilite Qur’an Commentary: 
The Kashshāf of Jār Allāh al-Zamakhsharī (d.538/1144) (Boston: Brill, 2006); Kifayat Ullah, Al-
Kashshaf: Al-Zamakhshari’s (d. 538/1144) Mutazilite Exegesis Of The Quran  (New York: De 
Gruyter, 2017); Doğan, History Of The Methodology, 169-174; Maḥmūd, Manāhij al-mufassirīn, 
105-110; Al-Banjabīrī, Ṭabaqāt al-mufassirīn, 200-202; Nuwayhiḍ, Mu‘jam al-mufassirīn, 666.
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wisdom (al-ḥikma) that God destroys the communities unjustly while its 
people are rightdoers. His essence transcends (tanzīhā li-dhātahu) wrong-
doing. And proclaims with it that He destroyed rightdoers due to [their 
own] wrongdoing. And it is said (qīla): The wrongdoing is idolatry, and its 
meaning is that He does not destroy the communities caused by (bi-sa-
bab) the idolatry of its people while they are rightdoers undertaking the 
right in what is between them and not incorporate (yaḍummūna) to their 
idolatry any corruption later on.”93
Al-Zamakhsharī’s work became, ironically, the central referenced tafsīr among 
all major schools in Islam and was the primary tafsīr text studied in Ottoman 
scholarship.94 Multiple marginal commentaries (ḥawāshī) were produced to 
counter or downplay its Mu‘tazila theology as a way to keep its popularity and 
central use in Sunnī curriculum acceptable.95 And with its popularity it also 
increased the normative status of reading (B). It is also in the classical period 
where grammar became to be employed to prove either the veracity of read-
ings (A) or (B), being a rather late development. This shows the multiple meth-
ods deemed necessary to ground the theological paradigm shift of reading (B) 
in the Qur’ānic text itself, instead of only in theological premises. Especially 
Ottoman exegetes will use al-Zamakhsharī’s grammatical proofs for the (A) 
reading, and his references to divine wisdom and transcendence over injus-
tice, in service of the (B) reading. The theological implications of reading (B) 
laid the ground for post-classical scholars as the Ash‘arīte theologian Fakhr al-
Dīn al-Rāzī96 to expand these into an Islamic rights discourse. In the classical 
93 Ibn ‘Umar al-Zamaksharī, al-Kashshāf ‘an ḥaqā’iq al-tanzīl wa ‘uyūn al-aqāwīl fī wujuh al-
tā’wīl (Beirut: Dār al-Ṣādir, 2010), 2: 686-687.
94 Naguib, ibid, 12-14.
95 Cf. Lane, ibid, 19-23; Walid A. Saleh, “The Gloss As Intellectual History: The Ḥāshiyahs On 
Al-Kashshāf”, 217-259; Walid A. Saleh, “The Ḥāshiya Of Ibn Al-Munayyir (D. 683/1284) On 
Al-Kashshāf Of Al-Zamakhsharī”, in Books And Written Culture Of The Islamic World: Studies 
Presented To Claude Gilliot On The Occasion Of His 75th Birthday (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 86-90; 
M. Taha Boyalık, “The Debate On The Nature Of The Science Of Tafsīr In The Tradition Of 
Sharḥs And Ḥāshiyas On Al-Kashshāf”, Nazariyat Journal For The History Of Islamic Philos-
ophy And Sciences 4/1 (2017): 87-114; Al-Maṭrafī, Al-‘aqā’idiyyat wa tafsīr, 674-677, 684-685. 
Shahab Ahmed and Nenad Filipovic, “The Sultan’s Syllabus: A Curriculum For The Ottoman 
Imperial Medreses Prescribed In A Fermān Of Qānūnī I Süleymān, Dated 973 (1565)”, Studia 
Islamica  98/99 (2004), 196, 207-210. For an extensive overview of commentaries on al-
Kashshāf, see: ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad al-Ḥabashī, Jāmi ‘ al-shurūḥ wa al-ḥawāshī (Abū Dhabi: 
Al-Majma ‘ al-Thaqāfī, 2004), 3: 1354-1367.
96 On al-Rāzī, his exegesis, and other works, cf. Al-Maṭrafī, Al-‘aqā’idiyyat wa tafsīr, 685-686; 
Al-Khālidī,  Ta‘rīf, 464-492; Maḥmūd,  Manāhij al-mufassirīn, 145-152; Nuwayhiḍ,  Mu‘jam 
al-mufassirīn, 596; Doğan, History Of The Methodology, 86-90; Tariq Jaffer, Rāzī: Master Of 
565  Osmanlı’da İlm-i Tefsir
period the dichotomy between ’īmān and a‘māl was specified by the technical 
categories of ‘ibādāt and mu‘āmalāt, which al-Rāzī further expanded into the 
dichotomy of divine and human rights (ḥuqūq Allāh wa ḥuqūq al-‘ibād): 
“What is intended here with wrongdoing is idolatry, as is said by the Ex-
alted: {idolatry is a great wrongdoing (Q.31:13)} And the meaning is that 
the Exalted does not destroy the people of the communities based purely 
(bi-mujarrad) on them being idolaters if they are rightdoers in social affairs 
(al-mu‘āmalāt) in what is between them and the occurrence that the pun-
ishment of extermination (‘adhāb al-isti’ṣāl) is not send down for the sake of 
being a people holding creeds of idolatry or unbelief. But on the contrary 
He only sends down the punishment when [they are] evil (asāwā) in social 
affairs and they expand harm (al-iydhā’) and wrongdoing. And for this the 
jurists (al-fuquhā’) say that divine rights (ḥuqūq Allāh) [concerning creed and 
worship] are based on liberality (musāmaḥa) and generosity (musāhala), and 
human rights (ḥuqūq al-‘ibād) on paucity (ḍayq) [of life-protecting mecha-
nisms] and scarcity (shaḥḥ) [of these rights]. And it is said in the tradition 
(al-athar) that rulership remains with unbelief and does not remain with 
injustice (al-mulk yuqbā ma‘ al-kufr wa lā yuqbā ma‘ al-ẓulm).97 Therefore the 
verse means: ‘And your Lord does not destroy the communities because 
of wrongdoing, meaning He does not destroy them based purely on their 
idolatry if they are rightdoers in their dealings with others in goodness (al-
ṣalaḥ) and appropriateness (al-sadād).’ And this is the interpretation (tā’wīl) 
of the ahl al-Sunna on this verse. They say: and the proof (al-dalīl) on it is 
that the people of Noah and Hūd and Sāliḥ and Lot and Shu‘ayb whereby 
the punishment of extermination was sent down on them, for what God 
the exalted relates about them, because of them harming mankind and do-
ing wrong to creation.”98
The ḥuqūq scheme represent both a rational heuristic as well as an Islamic 
natural rights regime which balances and uphold private and societal needs 
through the rule of law, by imposing duties on, and acknowledging claims by, 
individuals and governing authorities. This regime was constructed based on 
ontological and anthropological assumptions on what constitutes private and 
Qur’ānic Interpretation And Theological Reasoning (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); 
Yasin Ceylan, Theology And Tafsīr In The Major Works Of Fakhr Al-Dīn Al-Rāzī (Kuala Lumpur: 
ISTAC, 1996).
97 This ethico-political tradition is discussed below.
98 Al-Rāzī, al-Tafsīr al-kabīr, 18: 61.
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public interest (maṣlaḥa/pl. maṣāliḥ).99 Although there were some clear scrip-
tual designations of what constitutes a divine or human right, the overall con-
tent and structure of the ḥuqūq scheme was constructed through rational and 
dynamic intra-juristic discourses, and served as extra-scriptural indicators 
for determining maṣlaḥa.100 Divine rights came to represent God’s personal 
rights in relation to creed and worship (‘ibādāt) whereby God makes a sub-
jective claim on mankind to show “thankfulness to the benefactor (shukr al-
mun‘im)” as He created them and endowed them with reason and benefits.101 
These subjective claims are based on ritual obedience (al-ta‘bud) which can 
not be waived (lā isqāṭ) or their revealed prescripts changed (i.e. five prayers 
remain five in any situation102), their fulfillment acquiring maṣlaḥa in the here-
after.103 Next to these subjective claims there is a second category of divine 
rights which represent public interests which cannot be claimed by anyone 
in particular, rather they are one-sided public demands on the individual, as 
they are meant to rid the world of evil and corruption (ikhlā’ al-‘alām ‘an al-
fasād).104 Here God is used in an objective fashion to represent His creation in 
their general rights (ḥaqq al-‘āmm) and interests (maṣāliḥ/nafa‘ al-‘āmm) such 
as in matters of penal law (‘uqūbāt in the form of ḥudūd/ta‘zīr as ways of de-
terrence (zajr))105, ḥisba (of which jihād is the highest form), public safety, tak-
99 Anver M Emon, “Ḥuqūq Allāh And Ḥuqūq Al-‘ibād: A Legal Heuristic For A Natural Rights 
Scheme”,  Islamic Law And Society  13/3 (2006), 326-328. For discussions on maṣlaḥa, see: 
Felicitas Opwis, Maṣlaḥa And The Purpose Of The Law (Leiden: Brill, 2010); Zayn al-‘Ābidīn 
Al-Nūr, Rā’y al-uṣuliyyin fī al-maṣāliḥ al-mursulat wa al-istiḥsān (Abu Dhabi: Dār al-Buḥūth 
li-l-Darāsāt al-Islāmiyya wa aḥyā’ al-Turāth, 2004) in 2 volumes.
100 Emon, Natural Rights, 355-365; Emon, Legal Heuristic, 390. 
101 Vasalou, Moral Agents, 46; Al-Shāṭibī, Al-muwāfaqāt, 1: 250; Al-Zuḥaylī, Uṣūl, 1: 154-155; Al-
Dabūsī, Taqwīm, 437; Al-Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-talwīḥ, 2: 316-317.
102 The revealed prescripts revolve around the five pillars: testifying to God’s monotheism and 
Muḥammad’s messengership (shahāda), obligatory prayers (ṣalāt), almstax (zakāt), fast-
ing during Ramaḍān (ṣiyām), and pilgrimage (ḥajj). But within these revealed prescripts are 
exceptions incorporated to protect human welfare, such as shortening the prayer during 
travel or delaying or compensating (kafāra) fasting due to travel or sickness. These excep-
tions are used as proof that human rights in general are hierarchically dominant over divine 
rights, and that eschatological maṣlaḥa is an extension of worldly maṣlaḥa, and rarely its 
replacement. Nyazee, Islamic Legal Maxims, 225.
103 Al-Shāṭibī, Al-muwāfaqāt, 1: 248; Al-Zuḥaylī, Al-fiqh, 9: 25.
104 Al-Zuḥaylī, Al-fiqh, 9: 22; Al-Zuḥaylī, Uṣūl, 1: 157; Mullājiyūn al-Ḥanafī, Nūr al-anwār, 2: 123; 
Emon, Legal Heuristic, 339; Hallaq, “God Cannot Be Harmed”, 8; Ahmed Akgündüz, Islamic 
Public Law (Rotterdam: IUR Press, 2011), 23.
105 On Islamic penal law and retaliation, see: Intisar A. Rabb, Doubt In Islamic Law: A History Of 
Legal Maxims, Interpretation, And Islamic Criminal Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2015), 29-39; Akgündüz, Islamic Public Law, 303-416; Al-Zuḥaylī, Al-fiqh, 5: 711-815, 6: 19-338.
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ing care of the destitute, means to travel and trade (infrastructure/markets), 
means to worship and education (availability mosques/institutes), ritual and 
charity compensations (kafāra), trust funds (awqāf), paying taxes (kharāj/‘ushr), 
providing truthful witness in courts, and fulfilling oaths, which all preserve 
the human necessities (which are subsumed under the universals/objectives 
of Islamic law, kulliyāt/maqāṣid al-sharī‘a) such as preserving life and access to 
wealth.106 Human rights are subjective private claims (ḥaqq khāṣṣ) preserving 
and representing individual interests (maṣlaḥa fard/khāṣṣa), such as rights of 
inviolability (‘iṣma), freedom (ḥurriya), ownership (milkiya), wealth (māl), trade 
(buyū‘), access to water, possible waver of retaliation by the victim’s family, re-
taliation (qiṣāṣ), repentance, fair trial, punishing the slanderer (ḥadd al-qadhf), 
family and its maintenance (nifāq), and inheritance (mīrāth). Human rights 
are technically unlimited as they are defined as “every rights-claim other than 
divine rights-claims”.107 Human rights were seen as ontologically established 
within every born human, whether they are a child or insane, representing 
a natural rights scheme grounded within the divine covenant (‘ahd)108, as ex-
pressed by the Ḥanafīte Abū Bakr al-Sarakhsī (490/1097):
“As God the Exalted created humanity to carry out His trusts (amānata-
hu)109, He dignified them with reason (bi-l-‘aql) and legal personhood 
(al-dhimma) in order to be a people with legal capacity (ahlān) for the 
necessary rights God the Exalted has placed over them. Then He estab-
lished for them inviolability (al-‘iṣma), freedom (al-ḥurriya), and property 
(al-mālakiya) to continue carrying out their trusts. Hence, this [right of ] 
freedom, sanctity, and property are granted to a person at the time they 
are born (ḥīn yuwlad). Those capable of discernment (mayyaz) and those 
not capable of discernment are equal (sawā’) in this regard, so this appli-
cable legal personality for the necessary rights (li-wujūb al-ḥuqūq) is estab-
106 Akgündüz, Islamic Public Law, 23-25; Mullājiyūn al-Ḥanafī, Nūr al-anwār, 2: 122-128; Hallaq, 
“God Cannot Be Harmed”, 9-10; Al-Zuḥaylī, Al-fiqh, 9: 22-27; Al-Zuḥaylī, Uṣūl, 1: 154-157; Al-
Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-talwīḥ, 2: 318-322; Al-Shāṭibī, Al-muwāfaqāt, 1: 292-293.
107 Al-Zuḥaylī,  Al-fiqh, 9: 23; Al-Zuḥaylī,  Uṣūl, 1: 157; Mullājiyūn al-Ḥanafī,  Nūr al-anwār, 2: 
123-125/128; Al-Taftāzānī,  Sharḥ al-talwīḥ, 2: 323, 337; Ahmed  Akgündüz,  Islamic Public 
Law (Rotterdam: IUR Press, 2011), 25; Khaṣṣāf and ‘Abd Al-‘Azīz, Sharḥ Adab Al-Qāḍī, 287-
288; Abū Bakr b. Mas‘ūd al-Kāsānī, Badā’i‘ al-ṣanā’i‘ fī tartīb al-sharā’i‘ (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub 
al-‘ilmiyyah, 1982), 6: 282; Nyazee, Islamic Legal Maxims, 221.
108 On Islamic covenant theology, see: Tariq Jaffer, “Is There Covenant Theology In Islam?”, in Is-
lamic Studies Today: Essays In Honor Of Andrew Rippin (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 98-121.
109 Referring to the trusts mentioned in Q.33:72, which are understood to be the fulfillment of 
divine and human rights. Cf. Al-Qūnawī, Ḥāshiyat Al-Qūnawī, 15: 430-435; SQ, 1040-1041.
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lished at birth whether they are capable of discernment or not capable of 
discernment.”110
The Islamic rights scheme envisioned natural (and revealed) rights and du-
ties as grounded in a human ontology in which the human is rational, so he 
can know his rights and duties, and a legal personality (ahliyya/dhimma), 
so he can claim and fulfill his rights and duties.111 A dhimma is a repository 
of incorporeal rights who has “the capacity to be the subject of relations of 
ḥuqūq—of acquiring claims over others and being the subject of claims in 
turn, of having rights and obligations.”112 This deontological human ontology 
was seen as universal, providing natural rights to all humans, whatever their 
age, background or mental state, whereby all humans (including unborn) are 
“people of necessity [in rights] (ahliyyat al-wujūb)”. And obligating all mature 
sane humans to fulfill those rights as in having taklīf to fulfill them, termed 
“people of fulfillment [of rights] (ahliyyat al-addā’)”.113 As within such a safe-
guarding context people will have the chance to know and pursue God’s per-
sonal rights. For the ‘ibādāt to be fulfilled, mu‘āmalāt must first be established 
and guarded to provide a context in which religious freedom arises. These ra-
tionally known rights (ḥuqūq ‘aqlī) indicate a minimal deontology based on Is-
lamic anthropological notions of human nature (fiṭra), necessary knowledge 
(wujūb al-naẓar/‘ilm al-ḍarūra), and “the rulings of things before the advent of 
revelation”, and provide a universal discourse and heuristic to construct ratio-
nal and revealed duties and right-claims for natural (i.e. non-political) and in-
stitutional (i.e. political/rule of law) contexts. The non-fulfillment or violation 
of divine and human rights constitute an evil (qabīḥ) which is either transitive 
or intransitive.114 When it is a transitive evil it hurts others (violates ḥaqq al-
‘ibād/‘āmm, i.e. horizontal ẓulm), and therefore a public or private claim arises 
110 Abū Bakr al-Sarakhsī, Uṣūl al-Sarakhsī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyyah, 2015), 2: 334.
111 For similar statements on this Islamic rights scheme, see: Al-Dabūsī, Taqwīm, 432; Al-
Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-talwīḥ, 2: 337; Recep Senturk, “Human Rights In Islamic Jurisprudence: 
Why Should All Human Beings Be Inviolable?”, in The Future Of Religious Freedom: Global 
Challenges  (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 290-311; Ruud Peters, “Islamic Law 
And Human Rights: A Contribution To An Ongoing Debate”,  Islam And Christian-Muslim 
Relations 10/1 (1999): 5-14; Nyazee, Islamic Legal Maxims, 221-233.  
112 Vasalou, Moral Agents, 47, 154.
113 For a full overview of Fiqhi discourses on ahliyya/dhimma, see: Al-Namla,  Al-Shāmil, 1: 
208-220; Al-Zuḥaylī,  Uṣūl, 1: 164-168; EI3, Oussama Arabi, “Legal Capacity”; Ahmed Ak-
gündüz, Islamic Private Law (Rotterdam: IUR Press, 2017), 52-82; Khazna, Taṭawwur al-fikr 
al-uṣūlī Ḥanafī, 376.
114 Vasalou, Moral Agents, 83-84.
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which needs to be fulfilled by punishment and/or compensation in this world 
(and when not fulfilled, in the next world). An intransitive evil refers to a sin 
which only hurts oneself (private sin, dhanb khāṣṣ) or betrays God in matters 
of worship (unbelief/idolatry, i.e. vertical ẓulm), which generates divine claims 
dealt with in the hereafter. 
Figure 2. Islamic rights discourse (ḥuqūq scheme) ã Arnold Mol
Sometimes public and private claims are both generated by a certain crime 
and can therefore become intermingled/shared (mā ijtim ‘ā fīhi/mushtarak) 
and even conflicting (khilāf), such as the question if the stolen goods or blood 
money are due above any penal punishment. Each school developed its own 
reasoning and hierarchy in when both claims are fulfilled, or when one claim 
overrules (ghālib) the other.115 And with the further development of the ḥuqūq 
scheme it becomes directly discernible within the tafsīr tradition, as Qur’ān 
verses provide plentiful resources to project the scheme on. One of the distinct 
trends of the ḥuqūq scheme within the Sunnī tradition is a clear hierarchy be-
tween divine and human rights, meaning that human rights as a premise will 
almost always overrule divine rights, a premise which is directly grounded in 
Islamic monotheism. As stated by Indian Ḥanafī scholar Mullājiyūn al-Ḥanafī 
(Mullajeevan, d. 1130/1718): 
“Pure rights of God the Exalted are connected to general benefit (nafa‘ al-
‘āmm) […] except that God the Exalted is too exalted to be benefitted in 
115 Emon, Legal Heuristic, 329, 334-336, 342-344, 361-363, 367-381; Hallaq, “God Cannot Be 
Harmed”, 22-26; Mullājiyūn al-Ḥanafī, Nūr al-anwār, 2: 123; Al-Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-talwīḥ, 2: 
315; Al-Zuḥaylī, Uṣūl, 1: 157; Al-Zuḥaylī, Al-fiqh, 9: 24.
570 Osmanlı’da İlm-i Tefsir
anything (ta‘ālā ‘an yantafi‘ bi-shay’), so it not possible that a right for Him 
is with this aspect and not [originally intended to] be directed at creation, 
because all [of creation] are equal in this regard.”116   
As discussed above, the fact that God is self sufficient (al-Ghanī) means He 
is therefore transcendent above any need or want. This applies both to His 
subjective and representative rights, as they are called divine rights because 
the “initiative [for commanding these rights] comes from Him [which would 
imply] that God is benefitted by it, and the condition is that God is needless 
(mustaghan) from that.”117 There is no divine right which does not incorporate 
creational benefit, nor is there no human right which does not serve Him.118 
So although divine rights in all its aspects served general benefit, there was 
a reluctance to apply maximum penal law (i.e. ḥudūd) by referring both to a 
prophetic tradition stating “avoid the penal laws by doubt (idra’ū al-ḥudūd bi-
l-shubahāt)”119, and by referring to the fact that fulfilling divine rights does not 
benefit God, nor does their non-fulfillment harm Him.120 Therefore divine 
rights are based on leniency (al-musāhala).121 This of course is not the same for 
human rights, on which human existence depend for survival and prosperity, 
which were therefore deemed as necessary (wujūb), and its presence in the 
world to be viewed as that of scarcity (shaḥḥ), paucity (ḍayq), and that they are 
easily undermined (ḍanna).122 It is this difference between creator and creation 
which was also projected unto the claims and duties linked to each ontology, 
creating a hierarchy of no-need (God) versus need (humanity) within the Is-
lamic ḥuqūq scheme. As expressed by al-Rāzī in his commentary on Q.1:4: 
“And it is known that the obligatory duties fall into two categories: divine 
rights and human rights. Divine rights are based on liberality (al-musāmaḥa) 
because the Exalted is needless (ghanī) of creation (al-‘ālamīn), and human 
116 Meaning there is no divine right which is not directed at the benefit of His creation, as He is 
needless, and everything in creation is equal to another from the aspect that He is creator 
of all. Mullājiyūn al-Ḥanafī, Nūr al-anwār, 2: 122. 
117 Muḥammad Ḥayāt al-Sanbihulī (d. 1978) in his gloss (ḥāshiya al-asrār) on the Nūr al-anwār. 
Ibid.
118 Hallaq, “God Cannot Be Harmed”, 5-6.
119 Rabb, ibid, 38; Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Uṣūl, 2: 347; Al-Zuḥaylī, Al-fiqh, 9: 911-913; Hallaq, “God Cannot Be 
Harmed”, 11-12.
120 Hallaq, “God Cannot Be Harmed”, 9; Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Uṣūl, 2: 100.
121 Al-Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-talwīḥ, 2: 371.
122 Emon, Legal Heuristic, 378; Al-Taftāzānī,  Sharḥ al-talwīḥ, 1: 421; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Al-
Maḥṣūl fī ‘ilm uṣūl al-fiqh (Damascus: Mussassat al-Risāla, 2012), 2: 244.
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rights are those which necessitates reserved caution concerning them (ya-
jib al-iḥtirāz ‘anhā).”123
It is exactly this hierarchy which became applied in the commentaries on 
Q.11:117. First by using general ethical terms as inṣāf and ḥaqq as referring to 
simply right-claims, after which it became replaced with technical terminol-
ogy as mu‘āmalāt, and finally with al-Rāzī introducing the ḥuqūq scheme with 
its maximum hierarchy. In this fully developed classical ḥuqūq scheme the 
punishment for violating divine subjective rights (i.e. vertical ẓulm) is not only 
restricted to the hereafter, but also completely ignored by God in this world124, 
whereas violations in human and public rights (i.e. horizontal ẓulm) are pun-
ished in both worlds and can even cause divine intervention. After al-Rāzī 
it was his fellow Ash‘arīte theologian al-Bayḍāwī125 who abbreviates Rāzī’s 
exegesis, although rejecting his absolute separation of belief and works and 
preferring al-Zamakhsharī’s wording (highlighted in bold) that divine worldly 
punishment is caused by idolatry combined with injustice. Interesting is also 
his replacing divine generosity (musāhala) with divine mercy (raḥma):
“{And your Lord does not destroy the communities for wrongdoing} for 
idolatry. And its people are rightdoers in what is between them with-
out incorporating corruption and rebellion with their idolatry. And this 
is His extreme mercy (li-farṭ raḥmatahu) and liberality (musāmaḥatahu) in 
His rights and from this do the jurists advance human rights [over divine] 
rights [when it comes to] hierarchy. And it is said (qīla) rulership remains 
with idolatry and does not remain with injustice.”126
Although al-Rāzī’s tafsīr was widely read, it was al-Bayḍāwī’s work which, due 
to both its density of complex theological and exegetical discourse127, and the 
123 Al-Rāzī, al-Tafsīr al-kabīr, 1: 192.
124 Although some viewed religious minority rulings (aḥkām al-dhimma) as a form of worldly 
punishment, this was rejected by others. Cf. Emon, Religious Pluralism, 135; Ismā‘īl Ḥaqqī 
al-Burūsawī,  Rūḥ al-bayān fī tafsīr al-qur’ān  (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyyah, 2013), 
3: 433-434; Muḥammad Thanā’ Allāh al-Maẓharī, Tafsīr al-Maẓharī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
‘ilmiyyah, 2007), 3: 265-275. 
125  On al-Bayḍāwī, see: Maḥmūd, Manāhij al-mufassirīn, 241-246; Doğan, History Of The Meth-
odology, 111-115; James Pollock, Edwin Elliot Calverley and ‘Abd Allāh al-Baydawi,  Nature, 
Man And God In Medieval Islam: ‘Abd Allah Baydawi’s Text, Tawali’ Al-Anwar Min Mata-
li’ Al-Anzar, Along With Mahmud Isfahani’s Commentary, Matali’ Al-Anzar, Sharh Tawali’ 
Al-Anwar  (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 1: xxiv, xxvi-xxxiii; EI3, Walid Saleh, “al-Bayḍāwī ”; Nuway-
hiḍ, Mu‘jam al-mufassirīn, 318; Al-Banjabīrī, Ṭabaqāt al-mufassirīn, 250-251.
126 ‘Abd Allāh al- Bayḍāwī, Anwār al-tanzīl wa āsrār al-tā’wīl (Beirut: Dār Ṣādr, 2004), 1: 475.
127 Although al-Bayḍāwī applies many of al-Rāzī’s Ash‘arī positions, he also deviates from 
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“Sunnī-fication” of al-Zamakhsharī’s exegesis128, became the standard repre-
sentation of Sunnī tafsīr.129 As stated by the Ottoman encyclopedic historian 
Ḥājjī Khalīfa (Katip Çelebi, d. 1067/1628): 
“And his tafsīr is the greatest book concerning this matter, rich in clarifi-
cation, specifically from [al-Zamakhsharī’s] al-Kashshāf what is related to 
grammar (al-i‘rāb), semantical meaning (al-ma‘nā), and clarification (al-
bayān). And from [al-Rāzī’s] Tafsīr al-kabīr the viewpoints from al-Rāzī re-
lating to philosophy and theology (bi-l-ḥikma wa al-kalām). […] And incor-
porates in it what kindles the light of thought concerning rational aspects 
and acceptable conduct. And shines [light] on the doubts that overcome 
[us] concerning the [mystical] secrets. And it is abundant in knowledge 
of exposition of discernment. Such as said by our master al-Munishī [in a 
poem]: ‘The people of intellect (awlū al-albāb) had not come up with what 
removes (bi-kashf)130 the veil from the recited131, but the judge132 has provid-
ed a luminous hand (yad bayḍā’)133 which will never fade.’“134 
Al-Bayḍāwī’s popularity can also simply be assessed by the fact that his exege-
sis has hundreds of commentaries and glosses written on it, and is preserved 
by the largest number of extant manuscripts of any exegetical work, even sur-
passing al-Zamakhsharī.135 It was deemed the “furthest goal and highest pur-
them many times to state his own, which are also less polemic when it comes to promoting 
cosmological naturalism and rational ethics as compared to al-Rāzī.
128 Al-Bayḍāwī discusses public interest (maṣlaḥa) dozens of time throughout his exegesis, 
both with legal and non-legal verses (for example on Q.2:216), while al-Zamakhsharī only 
mentions it a few times throughout his exegesis. Also, with verses on nature and cosmolo-
gy al-Zamakhsharī mostly focuses on discussing the imagery (taṣwīr and takhyīl) or meta-
phorical (tamthīl) hermeneutics used in those verses to convey a message, while al-Bayḍāwī 
follows him in this (see their exegesis on Q.41:11) he also adds natural philosophical con-
cepts (compare their exegesis on verse Q.41:9). Al-Bayḍāwī therefore also represents both 
an “uṣūl-ification” and an “Avicennian-fication” of al-Zamakhsharī’s exegesis.
129 Cf. Saleh, “The Gloss As Intellectual History”, 228.
130 This a nice word play on the Kashshāf, implying that al-Zamakhsharī’s work does not pro-
vide enough to fully understand the Qur’ān.
131 i.e. the Qur’ān.
132 This refers to the fact that al-Bayḍāwī was a judge in Shiraz, by which, within the tafsīr tra-
dition, he was identified. 
133 This is a nice word play referring to the name al-Bayḍāwī.
134 Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, 1: 186. I thank Sohaib Saeed for his help in translating the poem in a 
way that makes most sense. 
135 Cf. Al-Maṭrafī, Al-‘aqā’idiyyat wa tafsīr, 679; Al-Ḥabashī, Jāmi ‘ al-shurūḥ wa al-ḥawāshī, 1: 
310-343; Ahmed and Filipovic, “The Sultan’s Syllabus”, 197-198, 208-209.
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pose of the science of tafsīr” and the “peak of the study of the science of tafsīr” 
by the majority of authorities after him.136 But even with this widely accepted 
status of al-Bayḍāwī’s work, itself, and the multiple supercommentaries on it, 
Bayḍāwī and his impact is highly understudied in modern Islamic studies.137 
Due to the popularity of both al-Razī’s and al-Bayḍāwī’s tafsīr works138, as 
well as their interpretation seemingly representing the dominant theological 
trend of post-classical Sunnism, it was their rights discourse on Q.11:117 which 
became the dominant exegesis in the Sunnī tafsīr tradition and was directly 
cited, rephrased, or expanded upon by later exegetes. After al-Rāzī and al-
Bayḍāwī, almost no Sunnī exegete could only discuss aspects of divine respite 
without also referring to the humanistic hierarchy between divine and human 
rights.139 And it is this which we also see within the Ottoman tafsīr tradition 
on this verse.
Divine respite in the Ottoman tafsīr tradition
To understand how the Ḥanafīte theological tradition of the Māturīdī up-
held divine respite in relation to rational responsibility we need to look at 
Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī’s interpretations at several verses140 connected to 
divine worldly punishment (Q.6:131, 11:101–102, and especially 28:59), where 
he states that people will not be destroyed on earth as a punishment for un-
belief alone as unbelief is only punished in the hereafter (lā nahlikhum ihlāk 
ta‘dhīb bi-nafsi al-kufr fī al-dunyā…innamā yu‘adhibūn ‘adhāb al-kufr fī al-akhi-
136 Cited in: Ahmed and Filipovic, “The Sultan’s Syllabus”, 209.
137 Apart from the fact that al-Bayḍāwī as a scholar, and his exegesis itself, deserve mono-
graphs dedicated to them (we thankfully already have the monumental work by James 
Pollock and Edwin Elliot Calverley on al-Bayḍāwī’s theological tract, Ṭawālī al-anwār min 
maṭāli‘ al-anẓār, and its commentary by Maḥmūd al-Aṣfahānī), we can say the same for 
many of the supercommentaries which deserve to be treated as monumental works of their 
own. Such as the multivolume works by Muḥī al-Dīn Shaykh Zādah (d. 951/1544), Shihāb al-
Dīn al-Khafājī (d. 1069/1658), and ‘Iṣām al-Dīn al-Qūnawī (d. 1195/1781), which all have been 
published and are easily accessible. We need an inventory overview of the supercommentar-
ies and analysis to see how al-Bayḍāwī was understood and used by the later tradition.
138 Al-Rāzī became essentially the most read or referred to theologian in both Sunnī and Shī‘ī 
scholarship, see: Jaffer, ibid, 2-3.
139 Although beyond the scope of this paper, after al-Zamakhsharī it also became a mentioned 
opinion among Shi‘īte and Ibāḍite exegetes as well. I hope to incorporate both more Sunnī 
and non-Sunnī exegetical positions on this subject in future publications.
140 We see direct citations and references to al-Māturīdī’s tafsīr in the majority of Ottoman ex-
egetical works, showing his continued direct influence and status within Ottoman thought.
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ra).141 This differentiates him from the Mu‘tazila as they do believe people are 
destroyed on earth as a punishment for their kufr142, and it fits al-Māturīdī’s 
constant repeated theme that this world is the “abode of trial and testing (dār 
al-miḥna wa al-ibtilā’)” and not of “compensation and punishment (dār al-jazā’ 
wa ‘aqūba)” regarding belief and ethics.143  Murder, for example, is a test in 
relation to ethics and can never be a punishment for kufr.144 Only after the 
sending of a messenger (i.e. after bulūgh al-da‘wa is fulfilled), understanding 
his warnings and promises, and responding to him with mockery demands 
for destruction, stubbornness, haughtiness, continued social corruption, and 
obstructing people on the path of God, can destruction occur. Destruction is 
therefore caused by the combination of both theological and ethical injustice 
and not simply unbelief.145 Māturīdī discourse on divine respite therefore 
does not adhere to a collapsing of belief and works, but neither does it uphold 
a full separation between them either as we saw with al-Rāzī. Māturīdī theo-
logians therefore formed a middle path between the Ash‘arī and Mu‘tazila, 
and walked this middle path by applying an exegetical synthesis between the 
latter two. The first Māturīdī scholar known for his “Sunnī-fication” of al-Za-
makhsharī is Abū al-Barakāt b. Mahmūd al-Nasafī (d. 710/1310).146 His exegesis 
was widely used and considered by some as the best Sunnī redaction of the 
Kashshāf after al-Bayḍāwī’s147, especially because he provides several rebuttals 
of al-Zamakhsharī’s linguistic claims.148 But it generated only a handful super-
commentaries149, probably due to its emphasis on both Māturīdīte theology 
and Ḥanafī jurisprudence, thereby being considered less a crossover of the 
141 Al-Māturīdī, Tā’wīlāt, 8: 184-185. Al-Māturīdī uses Q.11:117 as a counterargument against the 
Khawārij by discussing when believers become unbelievers or not and when a land can be 
considered as a land of unbelief (dār al-kufr), but he does not discuss divine punishment. We 
therefore have to look at other divine punishment verses.
142 Al-Ṭabarsī, Al-tibyān, 6: 81; Abū ‘Alī al-Faḍīl al-Ṭabarsī, Majmu‘, 5: 269.
143 Al-Māturīdī, Tā’wīlāt, 1: 409, 434, 464, 563, 4: 529, 8: 192, 622, 10: 154, 286, 379, 523.
144 Al-Māturīdī, Tā’wīlāt, 5: 338-339.
145 Al-Māturīdī, Tā’wīlāt, 4: 621, 6: 181-183.
146 On al-Nasafī, see: Maḥmūd, Manāhij al-mufassirīn, 215-222; Al-Banjabīrī, Ṭabaqāt al-mufas-
sirīn, 258-259.
147 Some scholars claim al-Nasafī used al-Bayḍāwī’s work as a source, but many specific state-
ments unique to al-Bayḍāwī (especially on philosophy of nature) are, as far as I’m aware, 
not to be found in al-Nasafī’s work. Another indicator that al-Nasafī did not (heavily) rely 
on al-Bayḍāwī is the lack of ḥuqūq discourse on Q.11:117. So a more thorough analysis of this 
claim is needed. Cf. Maḥmūd, Manāhij al-mufassirīn, 217.
148 Maḥmūd, Manāhij al-mufassirīn, 218.
149 Al-Ḥabashī, Jāmi ‘ al-shurūḥ wa al-ḥawāshī, 1: 616-617.
575  Osmanlı’da İlm-i Tefsir
schools as al-Bayḍāwī was or deemed as being less in need of supercommen-
taries. His exegesis on verse Q.11:117 is a redaction of al-Zamakhsharī, editing 
out two sentences, and adding two original wordings. We have highlighted 
al- Zamakhsharī’s words in bold to visualize this: 
“{And your Lord does not destroy the communities} the lām is for con-
firmation of the denial {with injustice} is the condition of the agent 
meaning it is not true that God destroys the towns unjustly {and its peo-
ple} people are {rightdoers} as He transcends by His essence any wrong-
doing. And it is said (qīla) the wrongdoing of idolatry, meaning He does 
not destroy the towns caused by idolatry of its people and they are right-
doers in social affairs in what is between them and do not incorporate 
corruption to their idolatry later on.”150
We then begin our assessment of the Ottoman tafsīr tradition, with one of the 
first major supercommentary writers on al-Bayḍāwī (highlighted in bold), the 
Ottoman exegete Muṣṭafā ibn al-Tamjīd (d. 880/1476)151 who has no issues with 
the idea that God places a ‘restriction (taqyīd)’ on Himself based on wisdom 
and mercy. An emphasis which is difficult taken from an Ash‘arī perspective, 
but logical from a Māturīdī perspective:
“And ‘His extreme mercy and liberality in His rights’ means restricting 
Himself by disavowing destruction based on doing wrong to one’s self [by 
adhering to idolatry] (taqyīd nafī al-hilāk bi-ẓulm al-nafs), and by guarantee-
ing this established condition through His statement, and its inhabitants 
being righteous, they being instructed that God the Exalted is merciful to-
wards towards the person doing wrong to himself when he is not exceed-
ing in doing wrong to others. Doing wrong to oneself [as in adhering to 
idolatry] belongs to the rights of the Exalted and this verse proves that the 
Exalted is liberal in His rights when human rights are upheld. And this 
is from His extreme mercy. O God, be merciful on us and be extremely 
exceeding on us, and bestow us with guidance and success in avoiding the 
violation of Your servant’s rights!”152
Aḥmad b. Isma‘īl al-Gūrānī (d. 893/1488)153, the first Ottoman shaykh al-Islām 
known to write an original and complete exegesis, provides his own unique 
150 Al-Nasafī, Tafsīr al-Nasafī, 517.
151 On Ibn al-Tamjīd, see: Nuwayhiḍ, Mu‘jam al-mufassirīn, 673.
152 Printed in the margin of Al-Qūnawī, Ḥāshiyat Al-Qūnawī, 10: 237.
153 On al-Gūrānī, see: Naguib, ibid, 8, Al-Banjabīrī, Ṭabaqāt al-mufassirīn, 352; Nuwayhiḍ, Mu‘jam 
al-mufassirīn, 30.
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redaction of al-Rāzī, ignoring al-Bayḍāwī (even though al-Gūrānī’s exegesis 
is mainly based on the latter). To visualize his redaction we have highlighted 
al-Rāzī’s words in bold:
“{And your Lord does not destroy the communities for wrongdoing} 
without any sin because if He would destroy them He would be unjust, but 
no, the allegation [of performing injustice] in on them. Such as His saying 
{so that mankind may not have any argument against God (Q. 4:165)}, and 
{it was not God who wronged them, but it was they who wronged them-
selves (Q. 29:40)}. And it said: {bi-ẓulm} is because of idolatry. {and its 
people are rightdoers} meaning in what is between them from the social 
affairs of mankind (al-mu‘āmala al-nās) and human rights (ḥaqq al-‘ibād). 
As divine rights (ḥaqq Allāh) are based on liberality (musāmaḥa) and God 
will not destroy the people on idolatry alone. And the punishment of ex-
termination is not send down simply for the sake of belying (mujarrad 
al-takdhīb) such as in the stories of Hūd and Sāliḥ and His saying {and We 
rooted out those who belied Our signs and were not faithful (Q. 7:72)}.”154
The Ṣūfī exegete Na‘imat Allāh b. Maḥmūd al-Nakhjawānī (d. 920/1514)155, whose 
exegesis has been falsely attributed to the Ṣūfī saint ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jilānī (d. 
561/1166), provides a (B) reading applied in his own terminology which can not 
be directly linked to either al-Rāzī or al-Bayḍāwī, thereby showing the nor-
malization of the ḥuqūq reading on this verse:
“{And your Lord does not} and He does not based on His custom (sunnatahu) 
and it takes place by His convention (‘āddatahu). {destroys the communities 
because of wrongdoing} meaning caused by idolatry and unbelief spread 
among them. {its people} and its people are in the state (al-ḥāl) of being right-
doers on earth and are not corrupters on it. Meaning they are not seized by 
the Most Praised for the sake of divine rights alone without any link to human 
rights. But no! God seizes them when grave sinners and conflict start to circu-
late, and corruption becomes apparent, and humans dispute.”156
154 Isma‘īl al-Gūrānī, Ghāyat al-amānī fī tafsīr al-kalām al-rabbānī (Riyad: Dār al-Ḥaḍāra, 2018), 
3: 878-879.
155 On al-Nakhjawānī, see: Al-Banjabīrī, Ṭabaqāt al-mufassirīn, 365-366; Khalīfa,  Kashf  al-
ẓunūn, 2: 1292.
156 Na‘imat Allāh b. Maḥmūd al-Nakhjawānī, Al-fawātiḥ al-ilahiyyat wa al-mafātiḥ al-ghaybi-
yyat al-muwaḍḍiḥat li-l-kalam al-qur’āniyyat wa al-ḥukm al-furqāniyya (Egypt: Dār Rikābī 
li’n-Nushr, 1999), 1: 366; ‘Abd al-Qāḍīr al-Jīlānī and Na‘imat Allāh b. Maḥmūd al-Nakh-
jawānī, Tafsīr al-Jīlānī (Istanbul: Markaz al-Jīlānī li’l-Buḥūth al-‘ilmiyyah, 2009), 2: 424.
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Al-Gūrānī’s successor of the title of the Ottoman shaykh al-Islām, Ibn Kamāl 
Pāshā (Kemālpāshazāde, d. 940/1533)157, was a polymath writing commentaries 
on main texts of multiple sciences (including one on the Kashshāf), but also 
highly original works on theology and exegesis. In his work on creed he dis-
cusses the wisdom behind the sending of messengers which follows the phil-
osophical tradition’s emphasis on religion as the basis for civilization, serving 
humanistic ends158:
“We say: As God the Exalted created mankind and determined for them 
that their existence is dependent on survival, and He created for them the 
necessities [of survival] such as food, drinks, clothing, homes, and things 
of such nature. So mankind was made covetous for those necessities in 
service of their own existential survival [and are therefore hostile] towards 
Others, and are not content with what God the Exalted provides them and 
will therefore allow injustice, usurpation, theft, murder etcetera. So there 
no escaping that men are to be united by people of law which are send 
to them to forbid them those evils. They make a system of law and order 
between the people in this world and in order that they do not destroy this 
world. And guide them towards worshipping their Lord with their bodies 
and wealth so that they deserve by it paradise in the Hereafter. And those 
who do not do this are in the Hereafter a people lost and destroyed.” 159
This follows a humanistic theological vision we also see with the concept of 
divine respite and the ḥuqūq scheme, which Pāshā emphasizes in his exegesis 
in a unique synthesis of al-Bayḍāwī and al-Zamakhsharī (both highlighted in 
bold):
“{And your Lord does not destroy the communities} the lām is for con-
firmation of the denial [of destroying the towns] {with injustice} is the 
condition of the agent, being indefinite for magnification160 as an indica-
tion towards that destroying the righteous is a great injustice, and there-
fore the denial [of destruction] is guaranteed with the lām. And similarly, 
157 On Pāshā, see: Nuwayhiḍ, Mu‘jam al-mufassirīn, 39-40; Al-Banjabīrī, Ṭabaqāt al-mufassirīn, 
368-369.
158 That the sending of messengers to mankind is an act of divine wisdom and benevolence is 
central in Māturīdī theology, see: Al-Mazīdī (Ed.), Shurūḥ wa ḥawāshī al- ‘aqā’id al-nasafiyya, 
1: 156-157, 5: 90-99.
159 Ibn Kamāl Pāshā, al-Munīr fī al-Mawā‘iẓ wa al-‘Aqā’id (Istanbul: Dār al-Lubāb, 2018), 46.
160 Pāshā uniquely grounds the understanding of ẓulm as shirk in this grammatical reading, 
while all other exegetes are satisfied with the analogical use of the exegesis on Q.6:82.
578 Osmanlı’da İlm-i Tefsir
is ẓulm explained as shirk, with the bā’ as causitive, meaning you will not 
be destroyed caused by a great injustice coming from Him. {and its people 
rightdoers} the condition of being rightdoers is that they are acting with 
justice in what is between them. He has complete indulgence and mercy 
for His servant and generosity (musāhala)161 in His rights, and from this do 
the jurists advance human rights ]over divine] rights ]when it comes to] 
hierarchy. [Providing this verse with the] meaning: And your Lord certain-
ly does not destroy the communities unjustly as He transcends injustice 
by essence, or ]destroy them] caused by idolatry as long as they do not 
incorporate to their idolatry corruption between them. And because of 
this it is said that rulership remains with idolatry and does not remain 
with injustice.” 162
Another Ottoman supercommentary writer on al-Bayḍāwī is the Ottoman 
scholar Muḥī al-Dīn Shaykh Zādah (d. 951/1544)163 who uses al-Rāzī as a com-
mentary on al-Bayḍāwī164, and adds an extensive discussion on the grammat-
ical readings according to the Basran and Kufan schools and how this affects 
the exegesis. The focus on grounding theology in eloborate grammatical and 
rhetorical discourses became a distinguishing feature of the Ottoman tafsīr 
tradition. 165 The Ottoman shaykh al-Islām, Ebu’s-su‘ūd Efendi, was known for 
his reformist and reconciliation efforts concerning Ḥanafī jurisprudence and 
Ottoman civil law166, but especially for his exegesis which is deemed one of 
the best after al-Zamakhashari and al-Bayḍāwī, which he tried to surpass with 
his exegetical work.167 In his exegesis he begins with a rephrasing of al-Za-
161 Here he replaces Bayḍāwī’s single use of liberality (musāmaḥatahu) with Rāzī’s use of 
musāhala, showing a conscious use and preference of terminologies.
162 Ibn Kamāl Pāshā, Tafsīr Ibn Kamāl Pāshā (Istanbul: Irsad Kitabevi, 2018), 5: 231.
163 On Shaykh Zādah, see: Al-Banjabīrī, Ṭabaqāt al-mufassirīn, 371; Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, 2: 
1331; Nuwayhiḍ, Mu‘jam al-mufassirīn, 637-638.
164 This is in an almost similar fashion in how Sharif al-Dīn al-Ṭībī (d. 743/1342), in his famous 
supercommentary on the Kashshāf, uses al-Bayḍāwī as a commentary on al-Zamakhsharī. 
See: Sharif al-Dīn al-Ṭībī, Futūḥ al-ghayb fī al-kashf ‘an qinā‘i al-rayb wa huwa Ḥāshiyat al-
Ṭībī ‘alā al-Kashshāf (United Arab Emirates: Jā’izat Dubay al-Dawlat li-lQur’ān al-Karīm 
waḥidat alBuḥūth wa al-Dirāsāt, 2013), 8: 231-232. On al-Ṭībī, see: Al-Banjabīrī, Ṭabaqāt 
al-mufassirīn, 275-276; Nuwayhiḍ, Mu‘jam al-mufassirīn, 159; Saleh, “The Gloss As Intellec-
tual History”, 236, 245-246; Ahmed and Filipovic, “The Sultan’s Syllabus”, 198, 208.
165 Muḥī al-Dīn Shaykh Zādah, Ḥāshiyat Muḥī al-Dīn Shaykh Zādah ‘alā tafsīr al-Qāḍī al-Bayḍāwī 
(Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyyah, 1999), 4: 710-711. 
166 Cf. Colin Imber, Ebuʼs-Suʻud (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2009).
167 On Ebu’s-su‘ūd and his exegesis, see: Al-Banjabīrī, Ṭabaqāt al-mufassirīn, 374; Maḥmūd,   
Manāhij al-mufassirīn, 253-258; Naguib, ibid, 1-52.
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makhsharī’s statement on divine wisdom in that it is impossible for God to 
destroy the towns when they are not informed about their wrongdoing of un-
belief, which is why God let them remain in that state. This respite is also 
grounded in divine transcedence over injustice which, Ebu’s-su‘ūd states, is 
the main principle (qā‘ida) of the ahl al-Sunna. Zamakhsharī’s Mu‘tazilite 
emphasis of divine transcendence over injustice becomes Sunnī-fied within 
the Māturīdī tradition. Ebu’s-su‘ūd then synthesizes al-Zamakhsharī with al-
Bayḍāwī through different grammar readings, and provides an explanation 
to why there is a humanistic hierarchy between divine and human rights. We 
have highlighted al-Zamakhsharī and al-Bayḍāwī’s words in bold to show how 
much new exegetical discourse Ebu’s-su‘ūd provides here. 168
“This is with the meaning of truth and uprightness thus its meaning is 
that it is impossible from divine wisdom that He destroys the communi-
ties which is not a deserved destruction without warnings being conveyed, 
and thereby learning from this continued state of the unjust communi-
ties. And the lām ]in li-yuhlik] is to confirm the denial. And the {bi-ẓulm} 
meaning to clothe with it [i.e. referring to Q.6:82]. And it is said this is 
the condition of the agent, meaning He being unjust towards them. This 
being indefinite for magnification as an indication towards that destroying 
the righteous is a great injustice.169 And what is intended is that God the 
Exalted transcends that in totality with this illustration, as such charac-
terization is impossible as primary concept of the Exalted. As there is no 
wrongdoing in the acts of God the Exalted towards His created servant. 
This is an accepted upon main principle (qā‘ida) of the ahl al-Sunna, which 
we discussed previously at verse {And God is not unjust towards His ser-
vant (Q.3:182)}. And God saying {and its people rightdoers} being the state 
of the passive object, being affected by His agency. However, it does not 
express that restricting Himself concerns the locating of the state of the 
agent signified by {bi-ẓulm}. For the proof of the restriction is the disavow-
ing of the unjust destruction because of the state of its people being that of 
rightdoers. And there is no doubt in that [the destroyed people’s] corrup-
tion is absolute. And it is said: The wrongdoing is idolatry, with the bā’ 
as causitive meaning He does not destroy the communities caused by 
(bi-sabab) the idolatry of its people and they are rightdoers while they 
168 Ebu’s-su‘ūd Efendi, Tafsīr Abū Su‘ūd aw Irshād al-‘aql al-salīm ilā mazāyā al-kitāb al-karīm 
(Quetta: Maktaba al-Ma‘rūfiyya, 2011), 3: 358-359.
169 This small grammatical explanatory sentence is taken from Ibn Kamāl Pāshā.
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are rightdoers undertaking the right in what is between them and not 
incorporate to their idolatry any corruption later on. And that [God 
provides respite concerning idolatry] is from His extreme mercy (li-farṭ 
raḥma) and liberality (musāmaḥa) in The Exalted His rights (ḥuqūqahu) 
and that is why the jurists give precedence to human rights (ḥuqūq al-
‘ibād) as the rights being pushed forward ]in prominence]. Mankind is 
poor (al-fuqarā’) in relation to their rights compared to God the Exalted 
who is rich (al-ghanī) and extolted. And it is said that rulership remains 
with unbelief but does not remain with injustice. And you are informed 
that a place which forbids the reprehensible but allows the evil of idola-
try is not fitting. As idolatry is an entrance towards corruption on earth, 
which is providing an entrance [of hurting] the devout. And that is why 
all the messengers forbade it, as is related in their stories about warning 
[their peoples]. Its people are first [warned] about idolatry, then the wide-
spread sinning which they are undertaking. So this aspect charges al-ẓulm 
with an absoluteness of corruption which incorporates idolatry and other 
such rebellious matters. And the responsibility of reform (al-iṣlāḥ) on the 
people’s reformation and departure [from evil] is through some of them 
being focused on forbidding [idolatry] and some of them being directed 
towards admonishing without being insistent on idolatry and other forms 
of corruption170.”171
Another famous Ottoman supercommentator on al-Bayḍāwī is Shihāb al-Dīn 
al-Khafājī (d. 1069/1658)172, who emphasizes that although reading ẓulm as shirk 
has Qur’ānic precedence it does veer off from the literal import of the verse, 
the latter of which is better captured in the (A) reading as expressed by al-Za-
makhsharī. Khafājī therefore implies that the (A) reading is literal, and the (B) 
reading a non-literal interpretation. He then focuses on Bayḍāwī’s discourse 
on divine respite and human rights whereby he emphasizes that divine respite 
regarding idolatry is only granted as human rights take precedence over di-
vine rights, but this does not mean that idolatry is ignored as the granting of 
respite already implies that a violations of someone’s rights, i.e. God’s, is occur-
ring. Which is why divine worldly punishment is envoked when human rights 
170 Meaning, some messengers forbid idolatry and other sins from a position of law, and others 
only warned about its evil effects.
171 Ebu’s-su‘ūd Efendi, Tafsīr Abū Su‘ūd aw Irshād al-‘aql al-salīm ilā mazāyā al-kitāb al-karīm 
(Quetta: Maktaba al-Ma‘rūfiyya, 2011), 3: 358-359.
172 On al-Khafājī, see: Al-Banjabīrī, Ṭabaqāt al-mufassirīn, 417; Nuwayhiḍ, Mu‘jam al-mufassirīn, 
75.
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violations are added to idolatry.173 The Ottoman Ṣūfī scholar Ismā‘īl Ḥaqqī 
al-Burūsawī (d. 1127/1715)174 cites Ebu’s-su‘ūd’s rephrasing of Zamakhsharī on 
divine justice, cites elements of al-Bayḍāwī, al-Rāzī, and al-Samarqandī which 
he then uses as the interpretive framework to understand the prophetic tales, 
before closing of with the political maxim and its synonyms within Persian 
wisdom literature.175 We will end our assessment with the 18th century Otto-
man exegete al-Qūnawī176 who was the head of the scholars in his time, and 
wrote an extensive twenty volume supercommentary on al-Bayḍāwī. He elob-
orates on al-Bayḍāwī’s statement “liberality (musāmaḥatahu) in His rights” as 
“respite (imhālahu) in His rights”, showing the direct relation between divine 
respite and the humanistic hierarchy in divine and human rights (al-Bayḍāwī’s 
words are highlighted in bold):
“And his [Bayḍāwī’s] statement ‘because of idolatry’ explains ẓulm here 
as shirk based on exigency, and that {its people are rightdoers}. […] And 
his statement ‘what is between them’ is not between them and God the 
Exalted regarding their unbelief towards Him. […] And his statement ‘and 
this’ means the absence of destruction caused by the crime of idolatry and 
so long as they do not incorporate it with corruption and injustice towards 
other humans. And his statement ‘His extreme mercy and liberality in 
His rights and from this do the jurists advance human rights ]over di-
vine] rights ]when it comes to] hierarchy. And it is said (qīla) rulership 
remains with idolatry and does not remain with injustice.’ And His lib-
erality takes precedence […] and His extreme mercy and His respite con-
cerning His rights or forgiveness in this matter regarding His rights after 
the offense on earth, delaying the punishment. And this verse states that 
their destruction is caused by their unbelief which was tolerated, and 
which was then added with injustice and the violation of human rights 
such as murdering. And dutiful worship proscribes on someone almstax, 
pledges, and other such matters which belong to divine rights, while duties 
towards mankind takes precedence in fulfillment as being duties towards 
creation. And this is evident within the art of jurisprudence.”177
173 Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. ‘Umar al-Khafājī, Ḥāshiyat al-Shihāb ‘alā Tafsīr al-
Bayḍāwī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyyah, 1997), 5: 253-254.
174 On al-Burūsawī and his exegesis, see: Maḥmūd, Manāhij al-mufassirīn, 265-272.
175 Ismā‘īl Ḥaqqī al-Burūsawī, Rūḥ al-bayān fī tafsīr al-qur’ān (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr), 4: 201.
176 On al-Qūnawī, see: Al-Qūnawī, Ḥāshiyat Al-Qūnawī, 1: 5-7; Nuwayhiḍ, Mu‘jam al-mufassirīn, 
94. 
177 Al-Qūnawī, Ḥāshiyat Al-Qūnawī, 10: 236-237.
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The God who does no injustice, who gives respite for unbelief until the here-
after, does not give respite for human injustice on earth, and this establishes, 
both as a theology and a juristic maxim, that human rights are given prefer-
ence over divine rights. And this is all grounded in what was viewed as the 
main consequence of Islam’s radical monotheism: God is without need. One 
of the earliest Islamic references of this maxim tradition, ‘rulership remains 
with unbelief, but does not remain with injustice’, is by al-Māwardī in his 
work on political philosophy, Adāb al-dunyā wa al-dīn, in which he links it 
directly to the classical philosophers (ḥukamā’), and Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī 
(d. 505/1111) in the ‘mirror for princes’ work attributed to him, the Naṣiḥiyyat 
al-mulūk, states it is a prophetic tradition, which is unlikely.178 This maxim 
has a long history in political philosophy, and has been paraphrased by many 
scholars. One of its most famous proponents is Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), 
who rephrased it as: “Allāh supports a just nation (al-dawlat al-‘ādilat) even 
though it is an infidel [nation] (kāfira), and He does not support an unjust na-
tion (al-dawlat al-ẓālimat) even though it is a believing [nation].”179 The maxim 
was so prominent in Islamic intellectual thought that even the historian Ḥājjī 
Khalīfa refers to it: “The reason for the continuity of the mulk (state) of the 
unbelievers is their strict adherence to their siyāsah ‘aqliyya (rational politics). 
This is the meaning behind the Turkish idiom: ‘The world does not fall to 
ruin because of unbelief, but it does because of ẓulm’.”180 Given the promi-
nence of the maxim it was understandable for some to also use it as a form 
of exegesis at other verses such as done by al-Qūnawī at Q.2:35 to explain the 
injustice committed by Adam by which he was expelled from the garden.181 
Why a land can remain with unbelief but not with injustice is explained by 
al-Tamjīd: “This is because unbelief does not disregard [the rights and duties] 
towards the other, this is in contrast to injustice and disregard for the other is 
a cause for the destruction of the kingdom and this is the meaning of ruler-
ship not remaining with injustice.”182 
178 Abū al-Ḥasan al-Māwardī, Adāb al-dunyā wa al-dīn (Dār Maktabat al-Ḥayāt, 1986), 140; Abū 
Ḥamīd al-Ghazālī, Al-tibr al-masbūk fī naṣīḥa al-mulūk  (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyyah, 
1988), 44. See also discussed in: Lambton, ibid, 121.
179 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmū‘ al-fatāwā (Madina: Majma‘ al-Malik Fahd, 1995), 28: 63 (bāb fiqh al-ji-
hād).
180 Ḥājjī Khalīfa as cited by Asım Cüneyd Köksal, Fıkıh ve Siyaset: Osmanlılarda Siyâset-i Şer’iyye 
(Istanbul: Klasik, 2016), 101.
181 Al-Qūnawī, Ḥāshiyat Al-Qūnawī, 3: 184
182 Ḥāshiya Ibn al-Tamjīd in Al-Qūnawī, Ḥāshiyat Al-Qūnawī, 10: 237.
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Conclusion
In our analysis we have shown how the tafsīr tradition, as an accumulative 
and overarching science, is a direct reflection of the trends emerging in oth-
er Islamic sciences. Exegesis on verse Q.11:117 became an important marker 
for Islamic theology. This development within the tafsīr tradition, ran parallel 
to the paradigm shifts within Sunnī theology, whereby ethical monotheism 
and the separation of faith and works became more integrated. The Islam-
ic theological concept that God is transcendent above any need or want had 
direct humanistic implications. Fulfilling divine rights does not benefit God, 
nor does their non-fulfillment harm Him. Therefore, divine rights are based 
on leniency and mercy, and respite becomes the norm. But Islamic anthro-
pology viewed human rights, on which human existence depend for surviv-
al and prosperity, as necessary to fulfill. Islamic theology and anthropology 
projected the difference between creator and creation on its ethics and rights 
discourse, creating a hierarchy of no-need (God) versus need (humanity). It is 
exactly this hierarchy which became applied in the commentaries on Q.11:117. 
Al-Zamakhsharī, al-Rāzī and al-Bayḍāwī became the overall dominant exe-
gesis among later exegetes, representing the dominant theological trends of 
post-classical Sunnī Islam. Reconciliation between the (A) and the (B) read-
ings in the Ottoman tafsīr tradition was directly based on its Māturīdī theo-
logical adherence which developed a unique synthesis of al-Zamakhsharī and 
al-Bayḍāwī wherein divine respite becomes grounded in divine wisdom and 
justice.  The increase of supercommentaries in the post-classical period shows 
a redefining in how to engage the tafsīr tradition in the post-15th century era. 
Many of the referenced supercommentaries both use and respond to their 
central texts, and the authority these have in Muslim societies, as headers for 
their own discourse. Supercommentaries on the Kashshāf tried to Sunnīfy its 
theological positions, but the supercommentaries on al-Bayḍāwī used it as 
representative summarizations of the pre-15th century tafsīr tradition in total. 
The latter supercommentaries therefore seem to draw a line in the sand, mark-
ing a before and after in exegetical epochs. From the 15th century onwards we 
also see the rise of Ottoman ikhtilāf literature on Ash‘arī-Māturīdī differences. 
This development within Ottoman theology directly reflects the increase in 
exegetical supercommentaries on al-Bayḍāwī, whereby Bayḍāwī served as the 
Ash‘arī Other to which to respond to from a Māturīdī perspective. Just as the 
supercommentary tradition on al-Zamakhsharī refuted his Mu‘tazila theolo-
gy, so did the Ottoman supercommentary tradition on al-Bayḍāwī. But apart 
from the Māturīdī middle path adhered to in the Ottoman tafsīr tradition, we 
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also clearly see in the Ottoman tradition an expansion and maturing of both 
the science of exegesis and the implications of the humanistic turn taken in 
post-classical Sunnī theology. 
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